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ABSTRACT 
 
For more than sixty years, tax scholars have recognized conditions under which 
the government ceases to be a mere taxing entity—imposing a rate of tax on a 
business’s profits—and through the operation of tax law becomes more like an 
investment partner—contributing its fair share of capital to new investments and 
proportionately sharing in losses as well as gains. These conditions, which are 
satisfied by immediate expensing policies, are now common.  
The investment partner analogy has been analyzed from the perspective of a 
taxpayer who, as a result of partnership-like treatment, enjoys returns on 
investment that are effectively tax-exempt. However, far less attention has been 
paid to the government’s perspective. The government—based solely on the 
operation of tax law—contributes capital to and assumes risks of investments it 
does not select.  
This Article argues that when tax policies make the government descriptively 
less like a taxing entity and more like an investor, it should do what any rational 
investor is expected to do: identify its attributes as an investor, consider how these 
attributes affect its investment priorities, and seek ways to align its investments 
with its priorities. Taking the example of immediate expensing, this Article 
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identifies several changes that the government might make to tax laws to better 
align capital investing with its own preferences regarding risk, reward, and timing.  
After identifying several potential policy changes implied by the government’s 
investment role, this Article considers which changes make sense given the other 
priorities and roles of the government. In some cases, the government-as-investor 
perspective offers new justifications for tax policy changes that have long been 
advocated. In other cases, it suggests changes that should be rejected as inconsistent 
with the government’s competing priorities and roles. And in several cases, it 
reveals new policy prescriptions that should be adopted because they advance the 
government’s investment priorities, while at the same time advancing traditional 
tax goals and broader social goals. These changes could reduce distortion, increase 
revenues, promote economic stability, and even protect involuntary and unsecured 
creditors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It is not surprising that scholars of tax and economics have given such long-
standing, diverse, and detailed attention to decisions between capitalization1 and 
immediate expensing (the immediate deduction of the full cost of a long-term 
investment in the year it is made). Disagreements between taxpayers seeking to 
immediately expense their investments and IRS agents seeking to have those 
investments capitalized and recovered gradually over time are the single most 
common cause of audits and the single most expensive source of deficiencies for 
large and mid-sized businesses.2 At heart, decisions about whether investments 
should be capitalized and deducted gradually as they lose value over time or 
whether they should be immediately expensed are decisions about whether our 
system should aim to tax income or consumption.3 The argument about whether a 
                                                                                                                                                                           
1 When an outlay is capitalized, it is not immediately deducted. Instead, the outlay creates “cost 
basis” in the purchased asset. 26 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (2012). If the asset is depreciable tangible property, 
this cost basis is recovered gradually over time through § 167 and § 168 “depreciation deduction[s].” Id. 
§§ 167(a), 168(a). If the asset is amortizable intangible property, this cost basis is recovered gradually 
over time through § 167 and § 197 “amortization deduction[s].” Id. §§ 167(a), 197(a). Finally, if the 
asset is neither depreciable nor amortizable, the cost basis is recovered upon asset disposition. See id.  
§ 165(a) (providing that the owner of an asset may take a loss deduction if it is sold for a loss, 
abandoned, or otherwise disposed of for a loss); id. § 1001(a)–(b) (providing that when the owner of an 
asset sells it, she is not taxed on the full sale proceeds (known as “amount realized”) but only on the gain, 
which is defined as the excess of sale proceeds over her unrecovered basis in the asset).  
2 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-95-232, TAX ADMINISTRATION: RECURRING 
ISSUES IN TAX DISPUTES OVER BUSINESS EXPENSE DEDUCTIONS 2 (1995) (“In the 117 Office of 
Appeals cases, large corporate taxpayers disagreed with IRS most frequently over the issue of capital 
expenditures, which accounted for about 42 percent of the issues they contested. It was also the issue 
with the most dollars at stake in the 117 cases, accounting for $1.1 billion of the total $1.9 billion in 
proposed tax adjustments. In these cases, the corporations argued for immediate deduction of large 
expenses[,] . . . . [while] IRS contended that such expenditures had future benefits and should therefore 
be treated as capital expenditures, not immediately deductible in the current tax year.”); John W. Lee, 
Transaction Costs Relating to Acquisition or Enhancement of Intangible Property: A Populist, 
Political, but Practical Perspective, 22 VA. TAX REV. 273, 277 (2002) (footnotes omitted) (“[O]ver the 
last decade, expensing versus capitalizing of costs with present and future, often intangible benefits 
became the most significant federal income tax issue in audits of big businesses, which report the bulk of 
both the corporate sector income and additional tax revenues raised by tax audits and collections. An 
indicator of this phenomenon was the action of the Internal Revenue Service (Service) in directing team 
tax auditors of the largest 1500 or so corporations . . . to examine specific expensing/capitalizing issues . 
. . .”); id. at 278 (explaining that “[b]etween 25% and 40% of the audit and litigation resources of the 
Large and Mid-Size Business unit (LMSB) of the Service” were devoted to expensing versus 
capitalization issues); Ethan Yale, When Are Capitalization Exceptions Justified?, 57 TAX L. REV. 549, 
549 (2004) (“[R]ules [that a taxpayer should capitalize an expenditure that produces long-term benefit] 
are among the most controversial in all of federal income taxation.”); id. at 549 n.1 (noting that 
“approximately 25% of audit resources for large and mid-sized businesses are devoted to capitalization 
issues”) (citing John E. Hembera, ABA Tax Section Meeting: Capitalization Issues on Front Burner, 
Olson Says, Tax Notes Today, Aug. 3, 2001, LEXIS, 2001 TNT 152–7). 
3 See, e.g., Noël B. Cunningham, The Taxation of Capital Income and the Choice of Tax Base, 52 
TAX L. REV. 17, 20 (1996) (explaining that the difference between a consumption tax and an income 
tax is that “[u]nder the [consumption tax imposed on] cash flow . . . all capital investment is deducted, 
or expensed, when made, while under an income tax, capital investment is recovered through 
depreciation deductions or upon disposition”). 
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normative income tax (which uses capitalization) is preferable to a normative 
consumption tax (which uses immediate expensing) has long raged.4  
Scholars have also considered how decisions between expensing and 
capitalization should be affected by practical realities, including that the income tax 
as implemented sacrifices economic ideals in favor of ease of administration. For 
example, the U.S. federal income tax avoids the difficulty of valuing each asset each 
year by declining to tax unrealized appreciation5 and by depreciating assets over 
estimated recovery periods from simplified schedules rather than their actual 
economic useful lives.6 Similarly, it avoids the difficulty of distinguishing between 
nominal and real economic gains by calculating gains without adjusting for 
inflation.7 In each of these ways and more, the income tax as implemented is not a 
                                                                                                                                                                           
4 See, e.g., William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 
HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974) [hereinafter Andrews, Consumption Tax] (advocating a consumption tax); 
William D. Andrews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor Warren, 88 HARV. 
L. REV. 947, 947 (1975) [hereinafter Andrews, Reply] (advocating that a consumption tax is “ideally 
fairer [than an accretion-type income tax] even if a true accretion-type tax were feasible”); Joseph 
Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income 
Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413, 1415–16, 1420–21 (2006) (advocating a consumption tax after addressing 
three common arguments for an income tax: 1) efficiency—since the comparison between tax bases 
“depends on empirically unknowable or indeterminate facts,” we should not presume that a consumption 
tax would be more efficient; 2) redistribution—while a consumption tax fails “to tax returns to savings,” 
leaving “enormous pools of wealth untaxed” and “creating vast inequalities in our society,” an income tax 
reaches these pools and better redistributes resources from the wealthy to the poor; and 3) fairness—“an 
income tax is more effective than a consumption tax” at reaching wealth, which is “thought to bring a 
host of benefits, such as power, prestige, and security”); Cunningham, supra note 3, at 44 (advocating a 
consumption tax); Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REV. 961, 966 
(1992) (finding that fairness supports the income tax’s inclusion of capital income in the tax base); Alan 
Gunn, The Case for an Income Tax, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 370, 374–78 (1980) (arguing that income best 
measures a taxpayer’s ability to pay tax); Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer than an 
Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081 (1979; Alvin C. Warren, Jr., How Much Capital Income Taxed 
Under an Income Tax Is Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax?, 52 TAX L. REV. 1 (1996) (advocating a 
consumption tax); Yale, supra note 2, at 550 (arguing that capitalization and economic depreciation are 
normative or first-best rules for an income tax, meaning that deviations should be rare and narrow). 
5 Andrews, Consumption Tax, supra note 4, at 1129 (“[W]hile waiting for realization may be 
convenient in relation to a single investment, the inconsistency between taxing realized gains and cash 
savings and not taxing unrealized and unrecognized gains, is the generating source of most of the worst 
complexity, inequity, and distortion in our existing tax.”). 
6 Jeremy I. Bulow & Lawrence H. Summers, The Taxation of Risky Assets, 92 J. POL. ECON. 20, 
21–24 (1984) (exploring the implications of “tax laws’ use of ex ante depreciation schedules rather than 
ex post depreciation”). 
7 Andrews, Consumption Tax, supra note 4, at 1143 (“[Inflation is a fundamental difficulty with a 
true accretion-type income tax since] [a]n increase in monetary values may not reflect any real 
accumulation or increase in value if the real value of money is going down. Changes in value that reflect 
only inflation are important, however, since the holder of property that goes up in money value is better 
off by that much than another who holds cash balances or fixed principal securities. The proper remedy, 
under an accretion model, if we wished to exclude inflation, would be a general adjustment that would 
not only offset any gain due to inflation for taxpayers holding assets that go up in value, but also produce 
a net loss for holders of fixed money amounts.”). 
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normative income tax, and scholars have considered how implementation issues 
should affect the selection of an appropriate tax base.8  
Finally, scholars have explored in detail how decisions between expensing and 
capitalization should be informed by predictable taxpayer responses to the 
imposition of tax.9 For example, because income taxes typically reduce the returns 
                                                                                                                                                                           
8 See, e.g., Andrews, Reply, supra note 4, at 947 (explaining that most of the author’s preference for 
a consumption tax as opposed to an income tax is based on “intractable difficulties in the existing 
income tax [that] arise from the virtual impossibility of achieving a satisfactory reflection of real 
accumulation in a practical income tax base . . . difficulties [that] could be readily avoided by pursuing 
the goal of consumption instead of accretion”). 
9 See, e.g., Joseph Bankman & Barbara H. Fried, Winners and Losers in the Shift to a 
Consumption Tax, 86 GEO. L.J. 539, 542 (1998) (“[T]he income tax reduces the standard deviation in 
possible outcomes on the upside and downside, by shifting a portion of the risk onto the government as 
an involuntary co-investor. This implies that investors may be able to offset entirely the effects of an 
income tax on risk by increasing their pre-tax level of risk . . . .”); Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, 
Is the Debate Between an Income Tax and a Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk? Does It Matter?, 
47 TAX L. REV. 377, 378 (1992) (explaining that even though an income tax appears to tax returns to 
risk-taking, “under certain assumptions, investors in risky assets are able to offset the effects of 
government taxation of the risk premium by changing their investment portfolios”); Cunningham, supra 
note 3, at 21 (“[T]he income tax will not reach the premium a sophisticated investor receives for 
investing in risky investments.”); Evsey D. Domar & Richard A. Musgrave, Proportional Income 
Taxation and Risk-Taking, 58 Q.J. ECON. 388, 390 (1944) (explaining that “[i]f [an income tax is 
imposed and] losses can be offset, and the Treasury assumes part of the risk, as well as of the yield,” the 
taxpayer will “adjust his asset combination so as to increase . . . total risk . . . above the pre-tax level”); 
David Elkins & Christopher H. Hanna, Taxation of Supernormal Returns, 62 TAX LAW. 93, 93 (2008) 
(“As is generally accepted, under certain assumptions an accrual income tax system taxes the risk-free 
rate of return on capital but does not tax the risk premium . . . .”); Louis Kaplow, Taxation and Risk 
Taking: A General Equilibrium Perspective, 47 NAT'L TAX J. 789, 793 (1994) (“[W]hen portfolio 
adjustments are made in a corresponding manner, an income tax consists of a wage tax plus a tax on 
riskless returns . . . .”); Jack M. Mintz, Some Additional Results on Investment, Risk Taking, and Full 
Loss Offset Corporate Taxation with Interest Deductibility, 96 Q.J. ECON. 631, 631 (1981) (“[T]he 
government, through taxation, reduces the variance and leaves unaffected the mean of the returns earned 
on the risky asset.”); Adam H. Rosenzweig, Imperfect Financial Markets and the Hidden Costs of a 
Modern Income Tax, 62 SMU L. REV. 239, 241–42 (2009) (“[U]nder a number of assumptions, 
relatively simple changes by both taxpayers and the government can result in risky returns . . . avoiding 
the impact of an income tax altogether.”); Daniel N. Shaviro, Replacing the Income Tax with a 
Progressive Consumption Tax, TAX NOTES 91, 102 (Apr. 5, 2004) (“[D]ue to portfolio adjustments, an 
income tax fails to affect either ex ante risk premiums or ex post risky outcomes.”); J.E. Stiglitz, The 
Effects of Income, Wealth, and Capital Gains Taxation on Risk-Taking, 83 Q.J. ECON. 263 (1969); 
David A. Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of Risk, 58 TAX L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) (explaining that 
individuals can and will “eliminate the tax on” returns to risk-bearing by ramping up the risk in their 
investments to the point that their after-tax returns match their pre-tax preferences). But see  
Bankman & Fried, supra, at 543 (footnotes omitted) (“The claim that investors can offset entirely the 
effects of an income tax on returns to risk relies critically on several assumptions. First, it assumes full 
loss offsets under the income tax, clearly not the case under existing law. To the extent losses cannot be 
recognized currently, an income tax will reduce the expected return to risky investments in a form that 
cannot be offset by portfolio adjustments. Second, it assumes that imposing an income tax will not 
change the pre-tax price of risky investments. The assumption is not a trivial one, because imposing a 
tax on risk likely increases the demand for risky assets, which will, ceteris paribus, drive down their 
expected return. Third, it assumes that investors can relatively costlessly increase the riskiness of their 
portfolio. In many cases, one or more of these assumptions will lack validity. In that event, investors will 
be unable to offset the effect of an income tax on marginal returns to risk.”); John R. Brooks II, 
Taxation, Risk, and Portfolio Choice: The Treatment of Returns to Risk Under a Normative Income 
2017–2018                Government as Investor: The Case of 
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from risk-taking that taxpayers enjoy (since they receive smaller after-tax profits 
rather than larger before-tax profits from their investments) and correspondingly 
reduce the losses from risk-taking that taxpayers suffer (since they experience 
smaller after-deduction losses rather than larger before-deduction losses from their 
investments), scholars have explored the extent to which taxpayers do what 
economics predicts they should do.10 They consider whether taxpayers increase the 
riskiness of their investments up to the point that their after-tax risks and returns 
match their preferences without regard to pre-tax investment performance.11  
Despite long-standing arguments on all sides of this debate,12 the United States 
has long maintained a mixed system in which certain long-term investments are 
capitalized and gradually depreciated while others are immediately expensed.13 
Further, the United States has employed an evolving system, using immediate 
expensing rules temporarily and flexibly so that the same asset might be eligible for 
immediate expensing if purchased in certain timeframes and subject to 
capitalization if purchased in other timeframes.14 The government has used these 
flexible rules with the aim of increasing capital investment and stimulating the 
economy during and following recession.15 
The mixed and flexible system is interesting because, while we purport to tax 
income in the United States, when we allow a long-term investment to be 
immediately expensed, we effectively exempt the income produced by that 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Tax, 66 TAX L. REV. 255 (2013) (arguing that a normative income tax discourages risky tax returns to 
some extent because it makes taxpayers less wealthy, and therefore, less tolerant of risk, which prevents 
them from ramping up the riskiness of their investments to the extent necessary to avoid incurring tax 
on risky returns); Martin S. Feldstein, The Effects of Taxation on Risk Taking, 77 J. POL. ECON. 755, 
755 (1969) (arguing that while “[t]he proposition that a proportional [income] tax with full loss offset 
increases personal risk taking is now widely accepted by professional economists,” this proposition has 
“relied on a variety of restrictive and implausible assumptions”); Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income 
Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 423 (2000) (arguing that investor myopia, transaction costs, 
and other market imperfections prevent taxpayers from ramping up the riskiness of their investments to 
the extent necessary to avoid tax on risky returns); Theodore S. Sims, Capital Income, Risky 
Investments, and Income and Cash Flow Taxation, 67 TAX L. REV. 3 (2013) (arguing that tax triggers 
a wealth effect that interferes with portfolio adjustments); Lawrence Zelenak, The Sometimes-Taxation 
of the Returns to Risk-Bearing Under a Progressive Income Tax, 59 SMU L. REV. 879 (2006) (arguing 
that the progressive rate schedule imposes tax on some risky returns because it causes some losses to be 
deducted at lower rates than some gains). 
10 See generally Weisbach, supra note 9 (examining whether models of taxation and risk in literature 
are realistic and reflect taxpayer behavior in the real world).  
11 Id. at 2.  
12 Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 4, at 1414 (characterizing the debate as raging since “at least 
the time of Hobbes and Mill, without apparent resolution”). 
13 See infra notes 98–110 and accompanying text. 
14 See, e.g., infra notes 109–114 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra note 173. 
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investment from tax.16 E. Cary Brown, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
economist, provided the most accessible explanation of this phenomenon, 
establishing that when the government allows a long-term investment to be 
immediately expensed, the government effectively becomes a co-investor or a co-
owner of the expensed asset.17 As Brown phrased it, through immediate expensing, 
the government “would literally be a partner” in the investment.18 Part I of this 
Article explains Brown’s perspective in detail. In short, it observes that a taxpayer 
who immediately expenses an asset receives an extraordinary benefit from the 
government at the time of investment in the form of tax savings equal to the cost of 
the investment times the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate. These tax savings mimic a 
capital contribution. If they are used to fund part of the investment’s purchase 
price, then the outcome is analogous to the government putting up capital equal to 
the tax savings and the purchaser putting up the remaining capital. When the 
government then assumes a proportionate share of losses (by allowing their 
deduction) and collects a proportionate share of profits from the investment (by 
taxing them), the imposition of tax is analogous to the government taking a 
proportionate return on its up-front capital contribution. 
Before addressing the co-investor relationship created by tax law’s immediate 
expensing policies, it seems useful to note that, in the United States, we are 
probably uncomfortable thinking of the government as an investor.19 Save a few 
recent, notable exceptions—including AIG and GM20—we believe that the 
government generally has and should continue to avoid direct investment 
                                                                                                                                                                           
16 See id.; see also E. Cary Brown, Business-Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, in 
INCOME, EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ALVIN H. HANSEN 300,  
309–10 (1948) (discussing “a graft of the Kalecki system of a credit for investment onto the Domar-
Musgrave system” to “neutralize the effect of the tax”). 
17 See Brown, supra note 16. 
18 Id. at 309–10. 
19 See, e.g., Barbara Black, The U.S. as “Reluctant Shareholder”: Government, Business and the Law, 5 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 561, 561–64 (2010) (observing that through the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP), the U.S. Government put a “staggering” amount of financial assistance into private 
businesses and “became a substantial equity holder in five major U.S. companies [AIG, Citigroup, General 
Motors, Chrysler, and Ally Financial (formerly GMAC)] . . . . [without a] rule book for how the government 
should act as a shareholder”); id. at 575–92 (exploring the government’s actions as a shareholder in these firms); 
id. at 564 (“Unlike some other countries, the U.S. government [typically] does not invest surplus funds or 
engage in entrepreneurial activities for economic gain.”); Benjamin A. Templin, The Government 
Shareholder: Regulating Public Ownership of Private Enterprise, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 1127, 1184–85 (2010) 
(noting that when the government assumes a direct ownership interest in a firm, as it did with AIG and GM, 
liberal market economy proponents worry that the government might be tempted to pursue broader social 
goals that might make “the firm less competitive”). See generally Benjamin A. Templin, State 
Entrepreneurism (Thomas Jefferson Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 1428108, 2009), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428108 (follow “Download this Paper” hyperlink) 
[https://perma.cc/JJ9N-ZDLW], (exploring conflicting philosophies of government and business). 
20 Mike Allen & David Rogers, Bush Announces $17.4 Billion Auto Bailout, POLITICO (Dec. 19, 
2008, 8:22 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2008/12/bush-announces-174-billion-auto-bailout-
016740 [https://perma.cc/CUF5-BVEG]; Matthew Karnitschnig et al., U.S. to Take over AIG in $85 
Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash As Credit Dries up, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2008), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122156561931242905 [https://perma.cc/3JZB-EV49].  
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activities.21 This Article does not take a position on whether the government 
should aim to expand or withdraw from its direct investments, or even on whether 
it should, as an independent goal, aim to expand or withdraw from the more 
extensive indirect investment activities described in this Article: those arising from 
the operation of tax law.22 Its goal is not to justify immediate expensing tax policies. 
Rather, it argues that since the government already, by operation of 
immediate expensing tax policies, acts like an indirect investor in  
long-standing,23 extensive, and expanding ways,24 it should expressly acknowledge 
and begin to be deliberate about this role. To guide that deliberation, this Article 
seeks to explore whether the assets that the government co-finances via tax policy 
are consistent with the assets that the government should invest in, given the 
government’s unique investment characteristics and priorities. To the extent that 
tax policy causes the government to indirectly invest in assets that are 
inappropriate given the government’s investment characteristics and priorities, or 
causes the government to fail to invest in more appropriate assets, this Article 
proposes policy modifications that would cause tax policy to better reflect the 
government’s investment role. 
When viewed from the government’s perspective, the co-investor analogy 
suggests several policy prescriptions. Some potential changes (like the possibility of 
using tax subsidies to privilege the government’s preferred businesses25 or issuing 
low-interest Treasury securities to finance high-risk investments26) should be 
rejected because they sacrifice other tax policy goals or produce benefits for the 
government merely by imposing corresponding costs on the public. Others (like 
denying interest deductions to taxpayers who immediately expense their debt-
financed investments) provide new justifications for changes long advocated by tax 
                                                                                                                                                                           
21 See supra note 19. 
22 By using the government-as-investor perspective, this Article considers how the government’s 
investment characteristics and priorities might inform immediate expensing policies. Some proposed 
changes would expand immediate expensing opportunities, see infra Part III.B (suggesting that 
purchasers should be allowed to partially immediately expense buildings and other real property 
structures), while other proposed changes would make immediate expensing policies more limited, see 
infra Part III.A.2 (proposing that immediate expensing, which is now permanent, be phased in and out 
based on changes to Treasury securities rates), or less generous, see infra Part III.C (reforming debt 
finance and securitization rules in ways that would make immediate expensing less appealing to 
taxpayers).  
23 Since at least the 1958 passage of 26 U.S.C. § 179, the United States has had a tax system in 
which certain long-term assets are immediately expensed at certain times, and this Article considers how 
the government’s investment characteristics and priorities might inform decisions about immediate 
expensing. See infra Part III. 
24 See infra Part I.D. 
25 See, e.g., Paul Chesser, Government Shouldn’t Pick Winners and Losers, AM. SPECTATOR 
(May. 24, 2011, 7:52 PM), http://spectator.org/blog/26160/government-shouldnt-pick-winners-and-
losers [https://perma.cc/6RLY-P47B]. 
26 See infra note 136. 
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scholars.27 Still others (like tagging immediate expensing policies expressly to the 
government’s borrowing rates and encouraging investments that compensate for 
difficult-to-diversify risk) should be adopted because they advance the 
government’s investment priorities while also advancing traditional tax goals and 
broader social goals.28 Finally, one important policy modification implied by the 
government-as-investor perspective could help achieve a goal long pursued by 
bankruptcy and secured transactions scholars. If the government more explicitly 
recognized and more aggressively asserted its co-investor role, it ought to prevent 
taxpayers from encumbering with a security interest the full value of property they 
elect to immediately expense.29 In turn, this would better protect the interests of 
tort claimants, employees with claims for unpaid wages, environmental claimants, 
and other involuntary and unsecured creditors.30 
Part I explains how the government comes to act as an investor in the 
acquisition of property by sharing in gains, sharing in losses, and contributing to 
the capital necessary to acquire property and shows how this investor role has 
become more common as immediate expensing and accelerated depreciation 
policies have expanded.31 If the current proposals to expand immediate expensing 
by the Trump Administration, the House, or the Senate are adopted, this role will 
only further expand.32 Importantly, the government becomes a co-investor in 
particular assets purchased by a taxpayer but the government does not become a co-
investor in the taxpayer’s overall business enterprise. Part II identifies unique 
characteristics that the government has as an investor, including cheap access to 
capital (especially during and after recession), deep diversification, and a 
                                                                                                                                                                           
27 See infra Section III.C.1. 
28 See infra Sections III.A.2, III.B. 
29 See infra Part III.C.2. 
30 See infra Part III.C.2. 
31 Some readers may believe that the government should not be in the business of investing. This 
Article does not take a position on whether it should or should not. Rather, after noting that tax 
policy—in long-standing, increasing, and well-recognized ways—already causes the government to 
participate in many taxpayer investments by providing tax breaks that mimic capital contributions equal 
to the taxpayer’s marginal rate, by proportionately suffering losses, and by proportionately sharing in 
gains, it suggests that the government should consider the implications of this investment-like role. At a 
minimum, the government should avoid being a thoughtless investor that ignores its investment 
priorities. Other readers may take exception to the analogy that tax law has long made between the 
government and an investor. But, it is worth noting that the biggest difference between a typical 
economic investor and the government is that a typical economic investor has more choice as to what 
investments to buy and sell, when, and for what price. That difference seems only to increase the 
appropriateness of the government paying attention to its investment preferences while bearing in mind 
its other responsibilities and commitments. 
32 UNIFIED FRAMEWORK FOR FIXING TAX OUR BROKEN TAX CODE 7 (Sept. 27, 
2017), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Tax-Framework.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KPJ3-3987] (proposing that policies allowing businesses to immediately 
expense depreciable assets should be extended “for at least five years”); A BETTER WAY: 
OUR VISION FOR A CONFIDENT AMERICA 25–26 (June 24, 2016), 
https://www.speaker.gov/sites/speaker.house.gov/files/documents/ABetter-Booklet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K8DF-4ZE9] (proposing that businesses should be allowed to “fully and 
immediately” write off the cost of tangible and intangible assets, but not land). 
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compromised ability to advance its investment priorities through sales of its 
property interests or investor protections.  
After observing that, whether it intended to or not, the government took 
advantage of its unique investment characteristics and advanced its own investment 
priorities by making immediate expensing more widely available and more generous 
during and following recent recessions,33 Part III suggests various ways that the 
government might modify existing law to better align tax policy with its investment 
priorities. These modifications include: automatically adjusting immediate 
expensing policies based on Treasury securities rates such that they would cause the 
government to pay for a larger share of its investments when it can borrow cheaply 
and a smaller share when it cannot; expanding immediate expensing to certain real 
property and other investments that likely compensate private investors for 
difficult-to-diversify risk and would therefore overcompensate the government; and 
reforming debt-finance rules on immediately expensed property to stop the 
exploitative use of government investments by the private owners of property.34  
The Article concludes by noting that these self-interested changes would not 
necessarily undermine—and in many cases, could meaningfully advance—
traditional tax values and social policy values. They could reduce distortion, 
increase revenues, promote economic stability, and even protect involuntary and 
unsecured creditors. 
 
I.  THE GOVERNMENT’S ROLE AS AN INVESTOR 
 
Scholars have long recognized that when the government imposes an income 
tax, it acts, to varying degrees, as an investor in the projects it taxes.35  
 
A.  Sharing Profits 
 
Simply by receiving a share (equal to the tax rate) of the profits generated by a 
project, the government enjoys one of the key features of partnership.36 The 
importance of profit-sharing is recognized by the Uniform Partnership Act, which 
                                                                                                                                                                           
33 Significant evidence indicates that the government intended immediate expensing and accelerated 
depreciation policies to promote general economic stimulus by increasing the positive net present value 
of capital investments. See infra note 173. However, data is mixed on whether these policies achieved 
this intent. See Rebecca N. Morrow, Accelerating Depreciation in Recession, 19 FLA. TAX REV. 465, 
488–90 (2016) (reviewing the mixed economic impacts of accelerated depreciation).  
34 See infra Part III. 
35 See, e.g., supra note 9. 
36 See, e.g., Domar & Musgrave, supra note 9, at 389 (“By imposing an income tax on the investor, 
the Treasury appoints itself as his partner, who will always share in his gains, but whose share in his 
losses will depend on the investor’s ability to [deduct losses and to] offset losses against other income.”). 
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provides that an entity37 that “receives a share of the profits of a business is 
presumed to be a partner in the business, unless the profits were received in 
payment[s,] [including payments for a debt, services, or rent].”38 The presumption 
that profit-sharers are partners applies even when the profit-sharers did not intend 
to form a partnership.39 
When the tax system makes the government a mere profit-sharer by taxing 
profits but not allowing the deduction of losses, it reduces the taxpayer’s after-tax 
returns—diverting a share of these returns to be paid instead to the government—
without reducing the amount of risk that the taxpayer assumes by investing.40 
Accordingly, the tax system makes investing—and in particular higher-risk/higher-
return investing—less profitable, decreases taxpayers’ incentives to take risk, and 
encourages taxpayers to reduce the amount that they invest.41 An income tax 
system without full deduction of losses denies taxpayers a share of the returns that 
would otherwise compensate them for bearing risk.42 
 
B.  Sharing Losses 
 
A system that aims to tax net income, including the United States income tax 
system, does not simply make the government a profit-sharer in the income 
                                                                                                                                                                           
37 Although the Uniform Partnership Act uses the word “person” when establishing the 
presumption that a “person who receives a share of the profits of a business is presumed to be a partner,” 
it defines “person” to include entities and even governments. UNIF. P’SHIP  
ACT § 102(14) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2013); id. § 202(c)(3) 
(“‘Person’ means an individual, . . . government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, 
or any other legal or commercial entity.”). 
38 Id. § 202(c)(3) (“A person who receives a share of the profits of a business is presumed to be a 
partner in the business, unless the profits were received in payment: (A) of a debt . . . ; (B) for services . . . ; 
(C) of rent; (D) of an annuity or other retirement or health benefit . . . ; (E) of interest or other charge on a 
loan . . . ; or (F) for the sale of the goodwill of a business or other property . . . .”); see also id.  
§ 202(a) (“[T]he association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit forms a 
partnership, whether or not the persons intend to form a partnership.”). While the UPA does not define 
“co-owners” or “co-ownership” in the § 102 definition section, the presumption that a profit-sharer is a 
partner seems to imply that even if loss-sharing is a common feature of partnership, it is not an essential 
feature of partnership. See id. § 102;  
id. § 202(c).  
39 Id. § 202(a) (stating that, except for associations formed under non-partnership statutes, “the 
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit forms a partnership, 
whether or not the persons intend to form a partnership”). 
40 See Domar & Musgrave, supra note 9, at 403 (“By imposing a tax without loss offset, the 
Treasury shares in the investor’s gains, while leaving his losses unchanged.”). 
41 Id. at 405–06 (“[T]ax will reduce the compensation per unit of risk. . . . [and] [t]he investor will 
therefore tend to take less risk.”); id. at 408 (“If the tax is very heavy, the investor may prefer to hold . . . 
assets in cash.”); see also id. at 408–09 (“Prior to imposition of a tax, the investor is indifferent between 
a more risky investment, bearing, say, ten per cent, and a less risky investment, bearing, say, three per 
cent, the difference of seven per cent being just sufficient to compensate the investor for the additional 
risk of the second investment. If now a 50 per cent tax is imposed and both yields are cut by one-half . . . 
, the difference is reduced to 3.5 per cent, which is not sufficient to compensate for the difference in 
risk. Hence the conclusion that the investor will take the less risky investment.”).  
42 Id. at 405–09.  
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produced by investments. Instead, it allows taxpayers to deduct investment losses, 
which makes the government a loss-sharer in critically important ways. This feature 
of the income tax system was beautifully explained and explored in Evsey D. 
Domar and Richard A. Musgrave’s seminal 1944 article, Proportional Income 
Taxation and Risk-Taking.43 Domar and Musgrave observed that when a tax 
system allows a taxpayer to fully deduct losses as against income, the taxpayer and 
the government effectively share losses in the same proportion as they share 
investment profits.44 In a world of full loss deductibility,45 the income tax causes the 
government to enjoy a share of profits equal to the tax rate and to suffer a share of 
losses equal to that same tax rate.46 This is because the taxpayer’s deduction for 
losses suffered will reduce her tax liability by the amount of loss times the tax rate.47 
As Domar and Musgrave explain, “[F]ull loss [deductibility] means that whenever 
the investor suffers a loss, the Treasury reimburses him for a fraction of the loss 
equal to the tax rate. The Treasury thus becomes a partner who shares equally in 
both losses and gains.”48 While full loss offsets are necessary to make the 
government a full economic partner, the lack of full loss offsets likely has less 
impact in the context of immediate expensing because, through immediate 
expensing, the government has already fully shared in the large, up-front risk that 
the price for a capital investment will prove to have been too high.49 Additionally, 
some immediately expensed property is not affected by capital loss limitations since 
it is depreciable trade or business property addressed by 26 U.S.C. § 1231, which 
                                                                                                                                                                           
43 See generally id. (examining the Treasury’s potential for profit- and loss-sharing upon imposing 
income taxes on investors).  
44 See id. at 409. 
45 Full loss deductibility means that losses are fully deductible in the year incurred and at the same 
rate as income earned in that year is taxed. Many provisions—including net operating loss limitations 
and capital loss limitations—as well as the progressive rate schedule itself and the taxpayer’s need to have 
sufficient income to enjoy loss deductions, limit full loss deducibility. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 172 (Supp. 
III 2012) (limiting net operating losses); id. at § 469 (limiting passive activity losses); id. at  
§ 1211 (2012) (limiting capital losses); Leandra Lederman, The Entrepreneurship Effect: An 
Accidental Externality in the Federal Income Tax, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1401, 1409–35 (2004) (explaining 
restrictions on the full deductibility of investment expenses and losses). 
46 Domar & Musgrave, supra note 9, at 409; see also Zelenak, supra note 9, at 880–84 (explaining 
that the graduated progressive rate schedule itself limits full loss offsets “when it results in the potential 
gain from a risky investment being taxed at a higher marginal rate than the rate against which potential 
losses from the investment would be deducted”). 
47 Domar & Musgrave, supra note 9, at 409; see also Michael Livingston, Risky Business: 
Economics, Culture and the Taxation of High-Risk Activities, 48 TAX L. REV. 163, 188 (1993) (“The 
most important of these [loss limitations] is that losses generally are not refundable; that is, losses that 
exceed income for the taxable year are not refunded to the taxpayer, but are lost for tax purposes unless a 
carryover provision applies.”). 
48 Domar & Musgrave, supra note 9, at 409. 
49 See Brown, supra note 16, at 313 (explaining that while full loss offsets are necessary to eliminate 
any impact of tax, “[o]ne-year depreciation and a reasonably long carry-forward of losses would probably 
come very close”). 
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allows losses to be taken as ordinary losses that are fully deductible as against 
ordinary income, even as gains receive preferential capital gains treatment.50 
Scholars have described the government’s proportionate sharing of gains and losses 
as a form of partnership in the underlying investment.51  
In contrast to a mere profit-sharing system, a tax system that makes the government 
a full loss-sharer as well as a full profit-sharer does not decrease taxpayers’ incentive to 
take risk.52 As long as a taxpayer can fully deduct losses at his tax rate, the taxpayer does 
not suffer the full economic loss.53 Rather, the taxpayer’s net loss is the total loss minus 
the amount of taxes he saves by deducting the loss against other income, or total  
loss × (1 – tax rate), while the government bears total loss × (tax rate).54 This loss 
sharing is just the flip side of the taxpayer not enjoying the full economic gain from an 
investment and instead enjoying total gain × (1 – tax rate) while the government enjoys 
total gain × (tax rate).55 Since an income tax system with full loss deductibility causes 
the government to share equally in losses and gains, it does not decrease incentives to 
take risk.56  
While an income tax system with full loss offsets reduces the taxpayer’s after-tax 
returns from an investment, it correspondingly reduces the  
after-tax risk level of that investment.57 In other words, “The yield and the risk of 
the investment have been reduced by the rate of the tax, so that the return per unit 
                                                                                                                                                                           
50 See 26 U.S.C. § 1231 (Supp. III 2012).  
51 See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 9, at 883–84 (footnote omitted) (“When the income tax [with full 
loss offsets] is introduced, it reduces the taxpayer’s expected return per dollar invested in the risky asset, 
but it correspondingly reduces the risk per dollar invested (because of the cushioning effect of full loss 
offsets). When the taxpayer increases [the amount of] his investment in the risky asset by a factor of  
1/(1 - t), he reproduces the level of risk he was willing to accept in the no tax world, and he also 
reproduces the expected return to risk-bearing he enjoyed in the no-tax world. To put the point another 
way, a 20% tax makes the government a 20% partner in the risky investment (with respect to both gains 
and losses), and the taxpayer can return to his preferred tradeoff between risk and reward by increasing 
the partnership’s investment in the risky asset so that his share of the partnership’s investment equals the 
amount he would have invested in the risky asset in the no-tax world.”). Although increasing the 
amount of investment by a factor of 1/(1 − t), where t is the tax rate, comes close to returning a taxpayer 
to a no-tax world, it is not exact. Id. at 883. For example, this adjustment assumes that the taxpayer has 
access to the capital necessary to increase the amount of his investment, which he may not. See id. at 
883–84. Even if he does increase the amount of his investment, the payment of tax decreases the 
taxpayer’s wealth and therefore likely decreases his risk tolerance. Id. Finally, even if a taxpayer can 
afford to increase the amount of his investment, he will incur a tax on the “riskless rate of return” on a 
larger investment. See id. at 883–84 (explaining that after a taxpayer increases the amount of investment 
to replicate pre-tax preferences for risk and reward, the result is the imposition of an income tax only on 
the “riskless rate of return on the entire portfolio”); see also Brooks, supra note 9, at 256–57 (explaining 
that the no-tax world cannot be replicated since tax necessarily reduces a taxpayer’s wealth and a 
reduction in wealth is associated with a reduction in risk tolerance). 
52 Domar & Musgrave, supra note 9, at 390. This is the theoretical conclusion. For some of its 
limitations, see supra note 51.  
53 See Cunningham, supra note 3, at 31. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. 
56 This is the theoretical conclusion. For some of its limitations, see supra note 51–52. 
57 See Domar & Musgrave, supra note 9, at 389. 
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of risk-taking remains unchanged.”58 If a taxpayer wishes to replicate his pre-tax 
risk and return preferences in an after-tax world,59 he can do so by increasing the 
amount he invests60 or by retaining his level of investment, but shifting more of it 
to investments that have higher pre-tax risks and returns,61 such that his share of 
the risks and returns after tax reflects his preferences.62  
Although an income tax system with full loss offsets puts the government in more of a 
partner-like role with the taxpayer than one without full loss offsets, this partnership analogy 
might still be more theoretically useful than practically observable.63 Imagine a prospective 
partner determining that he would like to participate in an investment, demanding a share of 
the investment’s returns from the existing partners and claiming that it would be fair for him to 
receive this share of returns simply because he would also agree to proportionately share in any 
                                                                                                                                                                           
58 Id. 
59 The pre-tax world is not perfectly replicated since the taxpayer must pay tax on the  
risk-free component of the return even if she makes adjustments to her investment portfolio to 
appropriately ramp up pre-tax risk (such that after sharing that risk with the government, she achieves 
her risk preferences in the after-tax world). See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 9, at 2 (explaining that after 
portfolio adjustments, “[a]ll that is left of capital income to be taxed is the risk-free or pure time value 
return”). 
60 See, e.g., id. at 8–12 (showing that because an income tax with full loss offsets not only reduces 
the positive expected return on an investment by the tax rate, but also decreases the risk of the 
investment proportionately, allowing the taxpayer to increase the size of the investment (by 1/(1 − t)) 
and be “in exactly the same position as without tax”). 
61 Weisbach, supra note 9, at 16 n.23 (“[I]f derivative markets in the risk in question exist, the 
individual need not borrow and buy an investment. Instead, he can eliminate the tax on risk merely by 
increasing his bet through a derivative.”); Zelenak, supra note 9, at 882–84 (showing that the taxpayer 
need not necessarily fund the increase in his risky investments by savings; instead, he could fund this 
increase by diverting from safe investments growing at the riskless rate of return and providing a 
mathematical example of such a diversion). 
62 For a numeric example, see Zelenak, supra note 9, at 884 (explaining that by diverting amounts 
from safe to risky investments, a taxpayer “reproduces the expected return to  
risk-bearing he enjoyed in the no-tax world. . . . [and] can return to his preferred tradeoff between risk 
and reward by increasing the partnership’s investment in the risky asset so that his share of the 
partnership’s investment equals the amount he would have invested in the risky asset in the no-tax 
world”). 
63 This analogy is deeply useful, informing many tax law debates, and even leading to a very well-
respected conclusion that the robust debate about whether to prefer an income tax or a consumption tax 
might not be about what base is subject to tax, but about how that same tax base should be reached from 
an administrative perspective. See, e.g., Andrews, Consumption Tax, supra note 4, at 1120 (“The 
difference between an accretion-type and a consumption-type personal income tax involves only 
accumulation, and it is in an important sense only a difference of timing.”); Michael J. Graetz, 
Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1575, 1598 (1979) (footnote 
omitted) (“[T]he widely expressed notion [is] that the difference between an income tax and an 
expenditure tax is solely a matter of timing.”); Weisbach, supra note 9, at 2–3 (footnote omitted) (“[A] 
Haig-Simons [income] tax is basically the same as a consumption tax (which imposes a zero rate of 
return on capital), and the debate between the two tax bases is not particularly meaningful. The decision 
[between income tax and consumption tax] might best be made on administrative grounds rather than 
on deep philosophical arguments about the proper distribution of the tax burden.”). 
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losses. That prospective partner might accurately point out that his willingness to share in both 
risk and reward means that the existing partners could restore their pre-existing economic 
position simply by putting more capital into the investment. Yet, it would be difficult, or even 
impossible, to find existing partners willing to sign on to such an expanded partnership. As  
newly-minted partners in law firms,64 accounting firms,65 architecture firms,66 dental 
practices,67 and medical practices68 (and their  
newly-depleted bank accounts) know well,69 becoming a partner is not simply a matter of 
agreeing to share losses as well as gains proportionately. Importantly, it is also a matter of 
“buying in” with a capital contribution.70  
The “buy in” necessary to acquire a co-ownership interest is not simply a matter 
of common practice; it is a matter of real economic importance.71 For example, 
real-world economic partnerships might observe that the contribution of additional 
capital can restore pre-existing partners to their pre-existing levels of risk and 
reward in existing investments, but they do not put the additional capital 
                                                                                                                                                                           
64 Anonymous Partner, Buying In: A Partner’s Perspective, ABOVE THE LAW (June 12, 2012, 10:07 
AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2012/06/buying-in-a-partners-perspective/?rf=1 [https://perma.cc/9HBQ-
EXXL]. 
65 Cheryl Meyer, What to Know Before You Become Partner, AICPA, 
http://www.aicpa.org/interestareas/youngcpanetwork/resources/career/pages/cpa-firm-partner-what-to-
know.aspx [https://perma.cc/6ETW-EF9J] (last visited Oct.. 26, 2017) 
66 See PETER PIVEN & BRADFORD PERKINS, ARCHITECT’S ESSENTIALS OF STARTING A 
DESIGN FIRM 2–3, 76–79 (2003) (discussing formation of a design firm and initial capital needs 
required for a successful business enterprise).  
67 See John K. McGill & Blake Hassan, Key Issues to a Successful Practice Buy-In, DENTAL 
ECON., Feb. 2011, at 104, 104 http://www.dentaleconomics.com/articles/print/volume-101/issue-
2/finances/key-issues-to-a-successful-practice-buy-in.html (URL would not allow Perma link). 
68 Joanne Tetrault, The Partnership Track, PHYSICIANS PRAC. (July 15, 2002), 
http://www.physicianspractice.com/articles/partnership-track (follow “PDF” icon) [https://perma.cc/M7AB-
87KJ]. 
69 New partners may finance their capital contributions with loans from third-party lenders or loans from 
the partnership itself, but debt-financing a capital contribution does not change the fact that a capital 
contribution must be made. See, e.g., Nicholas Gaffney, Financial Considerations for New Law Firm Partners, 
A.B.A. L. PRAC. TODAY (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.lawpracticetoday.org/article/financial-considerations-
new-law-firm-partners [https://perma.cc/ZW4H-QJL7] (explaining that many law “firms have banking 
relationships that can be used to facilitate financing” for a new partner’s “required capital contributions”); 
Thomas L. Snyder, Strategies for Partnership Buy-In, DENTIST’S NETWORK (The Dentist’s Network, La 
Jolla, Cal.), Aug. 14, 2007, http://www.thedentistsnetwork.net/newsletters/print/snyder/printSnyder26.html 
[https://perma.cc/5J7Y-3AKH] (explaining that new partners in dental practice may finance their required 
buy-ins with bank loans or partnership loans in which the “Senior Partners . . . function as a bank, charging an 
interest rate and receiving principal and interest payments”). 
70 See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text. The professional service partnership examples 
were selected because they are accessible. However, non-professional service partnerships also require 
capital contributions. Indeed, the requirement of buying in by professional service partnerships may 
make the point even stronger since the capital contribution is required even after the newly-minted 
partner has been deemed to have already contributed to the partnership’s profitability through 
partnership-worthy work as an associate.  
71 See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 3, at 36–39 (showing that even if a taxpayer can increase her investment by 
borrowing, taxpayers borrow at different interest rates and “[a]s a general proposition, the wealthier an investor, the better 
her credit rating and the lower her borrowing rate”); id. (explaining that by triggering a need to borrow in order to make  
tax-minimizing portfolio adjustments and to pay for that borrowing with interest rates that generally favor wealthy 
investors, the income tax has effects that are “regressive with respect to wealth”). 
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contribution requirement on the pre-existing partners.72 Rather, the new partner 
must supply the necessary additional capital.73 Accordingly, the new partner bears 
any costs needed to raise the capital and assumes a proportionate share of the front-
end risk that investments might be imprudent. For example, one risk of a capital 
investment is that it might produce net negative revenue (for instance, the 
investment is in a machine that produces less revenue than its cost of fuel); 
however, a potentially far greater risk of a capital investment is that while it 
produces net positive revenue, this revenue falls short of the expectations used to 
determine the asset’s price. As a result, the investment will be a loss, not because of 
annual losses (shared by all those who bear annual risk), but because it was 
purchased at a price that proved to be too high (a loss shared only by those partners 
who contributed capital on the front-end for their proportionate shares of the 
purchase price).74 
Taking this analogy to the world of tax, the government does not accurately 
mimic a full and fair investment partner by proportionately sharing ongoing risks 
and returns, while assuming that the taxpayer will be the source of any new capital 
needed to restore his pre-existing economic position. This might be consistent with 
the behavior of a taxing entity, but it is not consistent with the behavior of a true 
economic partner. Rather, the government acts more like a true investment partner 
when it supplies any new capital needed to restore the taxpayer to his pre-existing 
economic position, which, in this case, is equivalent to a tax-free position.  
 
C.  Sharing Capital Contributions 
 
The idea that the government might itself supply the new capital needed to 
make it more like a true investment partner, and to restore a taxpayer to a tax-free 
position is neither hypothetical nor far-fetched.75 Indeed, the government often co-
finances investments, and its role as a co-financer has recently grown.76 
                                                                                                                                                                           
72 See, e.g., id. 
73 See, e.g., id. 
74 Because total depreciation deductions over the useful life of an asset equal the purchase price of 
the asset, gradual depreciation causes the government to incur the risk that the asset was purchased for 
too high a price and that depreciation deductions will be too large given the smaller income produced by 
the asset. For a discussion on depreciation policy, see, for example, Henry J. Lischer, Jr., Depreciation 
Policy: Whither Thou Goest, 32 SW. L.J. 545 (1978). However, this risk is far larger in the case of 
immediate expensing and accelerated depreciation since these policies cause the government to pay its 
full share of the purchase price in the year of acquisition. See id. at 553, 588–89. 
75 The Domar & Musgrave result follows from the government proportionately sharing gains and 
losses. See Domar & Musgrave, supra note 9, at 389–91. Since this reduces the risk of an investment 
commensurate with tax’s reduction of the returns to that investment, a taxpayer can nearly replicate a 
no-tax world by increasing the amount of the investment to restore pre-tax preference for higher risk 
and higher reward. Id. The E. Cary Brown partnership goes one step further in that the government 
proportionately shares gains (through tax), losses (through full loss offsets), and the capital contribution 
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Looking at traditional investment partners first, the proportionate sharing of 
capital contributions to fund investments is common. When one partner 
contributes $20,000 to fund 20% of the purchase price for a $100,000 asset, we 
expect that he will properly collect 20% of the profits produced by that asset and 
suffer 20% of any losses. In so doing, the 20% partner is not “taxing” the 
investment; he is simply taking a return on the investment consistent with his share 
of ownership in the partnership. 
As E. Cary Brown established, when the government allows immediate 
expensing (also known as fully accelerated depreciation) of capital investments, it 
acts just like the 20% partner described above.77 Immediate expensing allows a 
taxpayer to deduct the full cost of a capital asset in the year it is purchased, 
resulting in a tax savings equal to the full cost of the capital asset times the 
taxpayer’s marginal rate.78 By providing these tax savings, the government 
effectively cuts the taxpayer a check for the amount of tax savings, which can be 
used toward the purchase of the capital asset.79 Other than a very short80 lapse of 
time between when a taxpayer purchases a capital asset and when he receives the 
tax savings, the government is like a partner that contributes a percent (equal to the 
taxpayer’s marginal tax rate) of capital (in the form of tax savings) to fund 
partnership investments.81 It then collects that same percentage of profits and 
                                                                                                                                                                           
(through immediate expensing). Brown, supra note 16, at 309–10. As a result, the taxpayer need not 
raise additional capital or reduce his wealth in order to increase the amount of the investment and return 
to pre-tax preferences. Id. at 310. Rather, he can simply use the tax savings from immediate expensing 
to fund the additional amount of investment. See id. As a result, he does not pay a tax on the risk-free 
rate of return of the full portfolio—only the share that the government did not effectively purchase via 
immediate expensing. 
76 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 16, at 300–02, 309–10, 314–16.  
77 See id. at 309–10.  
78 Id. at 309. 
79 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE CASE FOR TEMPORARY 100 PERCENT 
EXPENSING: ENCOURAGING BUSINESS TO EXPAND NOW BY LOWERING THE COST OF 
INVESTMENT 7–8 (2010) (“Allowing 100 percent bonus depreciation is economically equivalent to full 
expensing of depreciable asset purchases, because it allows a complete write-off of the cost of eligible 
property in the year in which the property is placed in service. Expensing a capital expenditure means 
the government effectively finances a portion of the investment’s cost (in the form of a reduction in 
current taxes). . . . [This means that] there is no tax imposed on the income representing the taxpayer’s 
investment “share” of the return from a marginal investment that a business is otherwise indifferent 
about making (unless tax rates change over time). Thus, for non-corporate businesses (which incur only 
a single level of tax), the expected income from an on-the-margin expensed investment in depreciable 
property is taxed at an effective rate of zero, and the minimum pre-tax rate of return required from such 
an investment is equal to the after-tax rate of return demanded by the firm to induce it to invest in 
tangible property. In other words, with full expensing, there is no additional tax burden imposed on a 
firm’s marginal investment activity in qualified assets.”); see also Brown, supra note 16, at 310. 
80 For quarterly taxpayers, the time lapse between an outlay and the receipt of tax savings from its 
deduction might only be a matter of months; for annual taxpayers, the lapse might range from a matter 
of months to slightly more than a year. See, e.g., IRS, IRS PUBLICATION NO. 505: TAX 
WITHHOLDING AND ESTIMATED TAX (2017), https://www.irs.gov/publications/p505 
[https://perma.cc/85RD-WJ9N]. 
81 See Brown, supra note 16, at 309–10.  
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likewise suffers that same percentage of losses produced by the investment.82 The 
government is not taxing its co-owner on the co-owner’s share of returns; rather, it 
is simply collecting its own share of returns based on its own share of ownership in 
the asset.83 Accordingly, any profit-sharing payments to the government over the 
life of the asset are not in the nature of tax; they are in the nature of proportionate 
returns on the government’s investment.  
Since the government is taking a share of profits and losses commensurate with 
its share of the total capital outlay, the taxpayer is restored to a tax-free position 
without having to increase either the amount he invests or the risk level of his 
investments. As E. Cary Brown concluded, by allowing a full deduction in the year 
a taxpayer purchases an asset, the Treasury effectively enters into an economic 
partnership with the taxpayer in which each party effectively contributes a share of 
the purchase price of an asset, and each collects its proportionate share of the 
income from the asset.84 Because the taxpayer is restored to a tax-free position, 
under the assumptions specified,85 an immediate deduction for a capital investment 
                                                                                                                                                                           
82 See id. The following is an example of the model: Assume for purposes of this example that a 
taxpayer is subject to a tax rate of 20%, that taxes are due immediately (ignoring withholding and 
estimated tax payments), and that the taxpayer is making a $100,000 capital investment with a 10% pre-
tax annual rate of return. The model is illustrated by comparing the effect of exempting the returns on 
the capital investment from tax (Scenario 1) to the effect of immediately deducting the full cost of the 
capital investment (Scenario 2). In Scenario 1, the taxpayer makes a $100,000 capital investment and 
does not receive any deduction for it. Each year, the capital investment produces $10,000 profits (based 
on the 10% pre-tax annual rate of return). Those $10,000 profits are exempt from tax, meaning that the 
after-tax rate of return is the same as the pre-tax annual rate of return of 10%. In Scenario 2, the 
taxpayer makes a $100,000 capital investment and deducts the outlay in full (resulting in a $20,000 tax 
benefit from the immediate deduction). The taxpayer has made a net outlay of $80,000. Each year, the 
capital investment produces a $10,000 profit (based on the 10% pre-tax annual rate of return). That 
annual profit of $10,000 is subject to a 20% tax rate, meaning that the government receives $2,000 in tax 
each year and the taxpayer retains $8,000 in after-tax profits each year. This continues as long as the 
capital investment continues producing income at the 10% pre-tax annual rate of return. The taxpayer’s 
annual after-tax return is $8,000. Although technically the capital investment was $100,000, so it initially appears that the  
after-tax rate of return is 8%, the economic realities do not match this initial appearance. The economic reality is not that 
the taxpayer outlaid the full $100,000 to purchase the asset; the economic reality is that the taxpayer made a net outlay of 
$80,000 and used $20,000 tax savings to fund the purchase price. Thereafter, the taxpayer received annual after-tax returns 
of $8,000 on a net outlay of $80,000. In Scenario 2, just as in Scenario 1, the taxpayer’s  
after-tax rate of return is 10% annually whether this outcome is accomplished by exempting the returns on the capital 
investment from tax or whether it is accomplished by the economically-equivalent approach of allowing an immediate 
deduction for the entire amount of the capital investment in the year of purchase.  
83 See id. at 310. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 302–03, 303 n.4 (listing the assumptions at work when an entrepreneur/taxpayer is certain 
of the net receipts an asset will produce to include: 1) that an entrepreneur invests whenever “the 
investment yield equals or exceeds the rate of interest” that “he must pay on funds made available to him 
for the investment”; 2) that tax policy allows full loss offsets, meaning that “each dollar of additional 
income will be taxed at the given rate; each dollar of additional expense will be reimbursed [through full 
deductibility] at the same rate. . . . whether or not past, present, or future taxable income is earned”; 3) 
that “[i]nterest and dividend payments are not deductible[,] . . . [meaning that, contrary to current tax 
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is the mathematical equivalent of exempting from tax the annual returns on that 
investment.86 Scholars have called this equivalence the  
“yield-exemption phenomenon.”87 
While the impact of this partnership has been analyzed from the perspective of 
a taxpayer who now enjoys returns on investment that are effectively exempt from 
                                                                                                                                                                           
rules,] the interest costs of the entrepreneur are not partially reimbursed by the Government through 
reduction in taxable income”; and 4) that interest rates available to entrepreneurs are not affected by tax). 
86 See Cunningham, supra note 3, at 25 (summarizing the assumptions simply by saying that “[a]t a 
constant rate of tax and allowing for full loss offsets, expensing the cost of a capital asset is the 
equivalent of exempting the yield from that asset”). While investments often have uncertain future 
returns, the proportionate sharing of this uncertainty between the taxpayer/entrepreneur and the 
government is consistent with the partnership analogy. See id. (explaining that uncertainty regarding 
returns does not undermine the government as investor analogy, except that the government is an 
investor that the taxpayer may not choose to exclude). 
The total exemption view is premised on the fact that under a cash flow tax, the government is a 
partner in all ventures—those that are lucrative as well as those that are not. It cannot be excluded. 
Therefore, the government invests in whatever an investor chooses, and in all cases, the investor's yield 
on her net investment is tax-free. The tax savings view, on the other hand, does not accept the 
government's participation as a matter or right and is designed to highlight one particular situation: 
where an investor faces an attractive, but limited, investment opportunity. As is the case with all other 
investments, the government cannot be excluded from participating in this investment. To the extent 
that its participation prevents the investor from investing as much in this particular venture as she would 
like, the tax savings view would hold that her return from this attractive investment is exempt from the 
cash flow tax only to the extent that the investor is able to reinvest her tax savings. 
Id. at 27. But see Graetz, supra note 63, at 1600 (noting that the  
“[i]mmediate–[d]eduction/[y]ield– [e]xemption [e]quivalence . . . reflects an ex ante approach to tax parity” in which 
predicted rates of return prove to be exactly and constantly accurate). If predicted rates of return, including the 10%  
pre-tax annual rate of return used in the example in footnote 82, prove inaccurate, the parity is lost. See supra note 82. 
A taxpayer who, in fact, experienced lower-than-projected returns would have been better off immediately deducting 
the full cost of the outlay and paying tax on its low yields while a taxpayer who, in fact, experienced higher-than-
projected returns would have been better off not deducting the full cost of the outlay and avoiding tax on its high yields. 
As Professor Graetz explains, “Under the Yield–Exemption option, ‘lucky investors might become very rich and owe 
no additional [expenditure] tax liability on future consumption of their wealth [and] unlucky investors will have prepaid 
a tax on expected returns and will then obtain no deduction for the losses they incur.’” Graetz, supra note 63, at 1600. 
While the “[i]mmediate–[d]eduction/[y]ield–[e]xemption [e]quivalence” typically takes an ex ante view, that 
equivalence holds ex post only “under a restrictive set of conditions . . . which are typically assumed (although often not 
explicitly) in the economic and legal literature.” Id. at 1601. These conditions are that: 
 
(1) Tax rates are not progressive; moreover, they do not change over time.  
(2) Taxpayers have no accumulated wealth when the system is first introduced.  
(3) The system is closed; either the taxpayer exhausts his wealth by death, the system classifies 
all remaining capital balances (all bequests) as being consumption in the taxpayer’s final 
return, or an identical tax is subsequently imposed on bequests in some other manner.  
(4) There exists a perfect capital market with no uncertainty; all taxpayers can borrow and 
lend unlimited amounts at a risk-free interest rate.  
(5) All income can be classified as one of two types: wage income or income to capital 
accumulated during and after the initial period.  
 
Id. at 1602. 
87 E.g., Deborah A. Geier, The Myth of the Matching Principle as a Tax Value, 15 AM. J. TAX 
POL’Y 17, 26 (1998) (describing this equivalence as the “yield-exemption phenomenon”); see 
Christopher H. Hanna, The Magic in the Tax Legislative Process, 59 SMU L. REV. 649, 681 n.174 
(2006) (“Dr. Brown has been credited with developing the theorem that immediately deducting the cost 
of an asset is equivalent to excluding the return of the asset from tax.”).  
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tax,88 less attention has been paid to the impact of this partnership on the 
government.89 As a result of this partnership, the government has—based solely on 
the operation of tax law—contributed capital to, and assumed ongoing risks of, an 
investment it did not select. Indeed, because the taxpayer selected the investment, 
it seems rational to assume that the investment will reflect the investment priorities 
of the taxpayer, not those of the government. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
88 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 16, at 310 (“From the point of view of the entrepreneur such a tax 
[allowing full loss offsets and immediate expensing] would imply a substitution of Government funds 
for private funds in proportion to the tax, with a corresponding shift in interest payments from private 
lenders to the Government in the form of taxes.”); Christopher H. Hanna, Demystifying Tax Deferral, 
52 SMU L. REV. 383, 384–86 (1999) (establishing that taxpayers benefit from the yield-exemption in 
many different situations, not just immediate expensing). Professor Hanna identifies four additional 
situations: 1) the deferral of tax on gain from installment sales, id. at 392; 2) the deferral of tax on 
prepaid income, id. at 399; 3) the deferral of tax on retirement plans, see id. at 406–08; and 4) the 
deferral of tax on unrealized appreciation, id. at 412. The yield-exemption phenomenon has been 
observed in other contexts, including retirement, where scholars have observed that Traditional IRAs 
(which allow a full deduction when funded but result in taxable income upon withdrawals) and Roth 
IRAs (which do not allow a deduction when funded but result in exempt income upon withdrawals) are 
equivalent provided the owner’s marginal rate at deposit equals her marginal rate upon withdrawals. See, 
e.g., Daniel I. Halperin & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Understanding Income Tax Deferral, 67 TAX L. REV. 
317, 325 (2014) (“[T]raditional and Roth IRAs produce equivalent results if tax rates do not change. 
Traditional IRAs and qualified pension plans are versions of expensing, while the Roth IRA is a 
straightforward example of tax exemption.”); Gregg D. Polsky & Brant J. Hellwig, Taxing Structured 
Settlements, 51 B.C. L. REV. 39, 39, 41 (2010) (exploring the exemption of the “investment yield 
imbedded within the structured settlement”). 
89 But see Cunningham, supra note 3, at 25 (“It is worthwhile to look at the government’s role in 
this investment. The government is in a very real way a co-investor . . . , if you will, a 40% limited 
partner. All gains and losses would be shared 60-40 by the investor and the government. The only 
difference between the government's role and that of a limited partner is that the government has no say 
in either making the investment or terminating it. These matters are totally within T’s [taxpayer’s] 
control. By virtue of T’s initial deduction, the government could be viewed as investing $400 to acquire 
a 40% interest in the [immediately expensed asset]. Each year, T’s tax payments of $40 to the 
government would be exactly equal to the amount that T would have paid a 40% limited partner. 
Similarly, if and when T sold the [asset], T would owe taxes of 40% of the proceeds, which could be 
viewed as a return of the government's initial investment, or if the [asset] becomes worthless, T and the 
government lose their respective investments. This analogy holds no matter how speculative the 
investment and no matter what the nature of the investment.”); Weisbach, supra note 9, at 11 
(describing how the income tax causes the government to share in risk/return “bets” selected by 
taxpayers, exploring the possibility that the government might adjust its portfolio to hedge those bets or 
retain its portfolio if it “like[s] its chances” on those bets, and concluding that “[t]he income tax 
becomes in this case just a complicated, indirect, and very expensive way for the government to take 
market positions”). 
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D.  Investor Role Has Dramatically Expanded 
 
The government’s role in the partnership that results when it shares profits, 
losses, and capital contributions for investments deserves more attention,90 
especially because expanded immediate expensing and accelerated depreciation 
policies have made these partnerships far more common.91 
Historically, while the government shared in the profits,92 operating expenses,93 
and losses associated with capital investments,94 it did not share in the initial capital 
contributions used to finance capital investments. Instead of allowing the 
purchasing taxpayer to deduct the full cost of a capital investment in the year the 
investment was made, which would have provided up-front tax savings to co-
finance the investment, tax law required the purchasing taxpayer to deduct the cost 
of a capital investment gradually over a series of years.95 Initially, gradual 
depreciation deductions were taken over the period of time that the capital 
investment was expected to produce profit (its economic useful life), such that the 
cost to acquire the asset would be fully recovered as the asset’s useful life ended.96 
While the government finally shared in the cost to acquire an asset by the time that 
asset was fully worn out and worthless, the burden to finance the investment at the 
time of purchase was borne by the taxpayer alone.97 Gradual depreciation created, 
and is still creating, partial partnerships between the government and purchasers of 
gradually depreciated assets, like buildings. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
90 E.g., Hanna, supra note 88, at 384–85 (explaining that while scholars have explored E. Cary 
Brown’s conclusion that “immediately deducting the cost of an asset is equivalent to excluding from 
gross income the future annual return of the asset. . . . the focus and confusion has always been on the 
concept of excluding the future annual return (or future investment income) of the asset from gross 
income [, while the economic partnership that takes place between the government and the taxpayer] 
has been almost completely ignored in the tax literature”).  
91 See Bruce Bartlett, Depreciation’s Place in Tax Policy, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX (Sept. 10, 2013, 
12:01 AM), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/10/depreciations-place-in-tax-policy/ 
[https://perma.cc/XP24-XBSK] (discussing the growth in the use of depreciation policies); see also 
supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. 
92 See 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(2) (2012) (stating that “income derived from business” operations is gross 
income subject to tax). 
93 See id. § 162(a) (allowing a deduction for “all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or 
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business,” which allows deductions for the 
cost of operating capital investments, including fuel and labor). 
94 See Brown, supra note 16, at 301. 
95 See, e.g., Simon v. Comm’r, 68 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Lischer, supra note 74, at 
550. 
96 Simon, 68 F.3d at 44 (“In its traditional incarnation, therefore, the pace of depreciation 
deductions was determined by the period of time that the asset would produce income in the taxpayer’s 
business [also known as the asset’s economic useful life].”). 
97 See Brown, supra note 16, at 301 (noting that because gradual depreciation causes deductions 
that are “spread over the economic life of an asset, the tax will adversely affect investment incentives,” 
even if the government allows full loss offsets). 
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However, the government departed from gradual depreciation for many eligible 
assets, like machinery and equipment.98 In its most significant departure, the 
government replaced gradual depreciation with full immediate expensing under  
§ 179.99 Initially aimed to simplify tax accounting for small businesses by allowing 
them to immediately expense investments100 up to a $2,000 per year cap,101 § 179 
has been expanded to allow much larger businesses to immediately expense much 
larger portions of much larger investments.102 In response to recent recessions and 
sluggish recoveries, § 179’s immediate expensing cap was raised to $100,000 in 
2003, to $125,000 in 2007, to $250,000 in 2008, and finally to $500,000 in 2010.103 
While lawmakers initially hoped that the expansion of immediate expensing would 
encourage increased capital investing and stimulate the economy following 
recession, on December 18, 2015, they embraced its use in non-recession 
economies by making § 179 immediate expensing permanent.104 As a result, 
taxpayers could immediately expense up to $500,000 of eligible investment in 
                                                                                                                                                                           
98 Section 179 defines “section 179 property” as “tangible property” (or certain computer software) 
that is depreciable, was “acquired by purchase for use in the active conduct of a trade or business,” and is 
either personal property or other “section 1245 property.”  
26 U.S.C. § 179(d)(1) (2012 & Supp. III 2012). Section 1245 property includes personal property and a 
few limited types of real property (including real property amortized under special elections, including 
pollution control facilities, qualified refinery property, and certain energy efficient buildings). Id. § 
1245(a)(3); see also GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31852, THE SECTION 179 AND 
BONUS DEPRECIATION EXPENSING ALLOWANCES: CURRENT LAW AND ISSUES FOR THE 114TH 
CONGRESS 2 (2015) (“With a few minor exceptions, this property consists of machinery and equipment 
used in manufacturing, mining, transportation, communications, the generation and transmission of 
electricity, gas and water distribution, and sewage disposal. Most buildings and their structural 
components . . . do not qualify for the allowance.”). 
99 Compare 26 U.S.C. § 179(b)(1) (Supp. III 2012), with id. § 179(b)(1) (Supp. IV 2006), id.  
§ 179(b)(1) (Supp. I 2006), id. § 179(b)(1) (Supp. III 2000), and id. § 168(a) (2012). See generally 
GUENTHER, supra note 98 (discussing the evolution of § 179 allowances).  
100 To immediately expense an investment is to deduct the full cost of an investment in the year the 
investment is made. 
101 Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85–866, § 204(a), 72 Stat. 1606, 1679 
(providing immediate expensing up to a $2,000 cap); see GUENTHER, supra note 98, at 5 (arguing that 
the initial purpose of immediate expensing was to simplify tax record-keeping for small businesses). 
102 Compare 26 U.S.C. § 179(b)(2) (Supp. III 2012) (establishing $2,000,000 as the reduction in 
limitation cap), with id. § 179(b)(2) (Supp. IV 2006) (establishing $800,000 as the reduction in 
limitation cap for years “after 2007 and before 2010,” $2,000,000 for years 2010 and 2011, and $200,000 
for years after 2011), id. § 179(b)(2) (Supp. I 2006) (establishing $200,000 as the reduction in limitation 
cap for years 2006 and earlier and $500,000 as the reduction in limitation cap for “years beginning after 
2006 and before 2011”), id. § 179(b)(2) (Supp. III 2000) (establishing $200,000 as the reduction in 
limitation cap for years 2002 and earlier and $400,000 as the reduction in limitation cap for “years 
beginning after 2002 and before 2006”); id. § 179 (2007), and id. § 179 (2003). 
103 See GUENTHER, supra note 98, at 3 tbl.1 (providing § 179 data for 1987–2015). 
104 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114–113, § 124(a)(1), 129 Stat. 2242, 
3053 (2015).  
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2016,105 provided their total eligible investment for the year did not exceed 
$2,010,000.106 For tax years 2017 and beyond, these permanent benefits will be 
further adjusted for inflation.107 Thus, whenever inflation is positive, these benefits 
will automatically increase.  
Since § 179 authorizes a taxpayer to currently deduct the entire cost of an asset 
worth $500,000 or less in the year of its purchase,108 § 179 makes the government a 
full investment partner in immediately expensed assets. In addition to taxing the 
profits and allowing the deduction of any ongoing losses produced by the asset, the 
government supplies capital in the year the asset is purchased equal to the purchase 
price times the taxpayer’s marginal rate.109 This provision of capital means that the 
government is effectively co-financing the investment. 
While immediate expensing is the clearest example of the government 
becoming a full investment partner by supplying its proportionate share of capital 
for a growing number of investments, it is not the only example. As lawmakers 
expanded § 179 immediate expensing, they also enacted and expanded § 168(k) 
bonus depreciation and applied it to a similar class of eligible investments, meaning 
that § 168(k) bonus depreciation can be taken in addition to § 179 immediate 
expensing.110 Bonus depreciation allows a large percent of an asset’s purchase price 
to be deducted in the year of purchase.111 When the bonus depreciation percent is 
100%, as it was at the end of 2010 and for 2011,112 bonus depreciation makes the 
government a full investment partner in the same way that immediate expensing 
does. But, over the years bonus depreciation rates have been set at different levels, 
including 30% at the end of 2002 and the beginning of 2003,113 and at 50% from 
                                                                                                                                                                           
105 Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015, § 124(a), (f) (establishing $500,000 cap for 
2015, but providing that it should be adjusted for inflation); Rev. Proc. 2016-14, 2016-9 I.R.B. 365,  
§ 3.03 (establishing that the cap remains $500,000 for 2016 due to low inflation). 
106 26 U.S.C. § 179(b)(2) (Supp. III 2012) (establishing that the immediate expensing cap “shall be 
reduced . . . by the amount by which the cost of section 179 property placed in service during such 
taxable year exceeds [an un-inflation-adjusted threshold of] $2,000,000”); Rev. Proc. 2016-14, 2016-9 
I.R.B. 365, § 3.03 (establishing that inflation adjusting makes the 2016 threshold $2,010,000). If the 
taxpayer’s total eligible investment exceeds $2,010,000, that excess causes a dollar-for-dollar reduction in 
the $500,000 immediate expensing cap. Id. For example, a taxpayer with total eligible investment of 
$2,310,000 may immediately expense $200,000 (reflecting the full $500,000 cap minus the $300,000 
excess over the $2,010,000 phase out amount). 
107 26 U.S.C. § 179(b)(6). 
108 Id. § 179(b)(1). 
109 See Brown, supra note 16, at 309–10. 
110 GUENTHER, supra note 98, at 3 (noting that most assets that are eligible for immediate 
expensing under § 179 are also eligible for bonus depreciation under § 168(k)). Of course, the total 
depreciation deduction may not exceed 100% of the cost of the asset, even if multiple provisions are 
used. Id. 
111 See, e.g., id. at 1, 3–4.  
112 Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111–312, § 401, 124 Stat. 3296, 3304–06 (authorizing 100% bonus depreciation for the end of 
2010 and for the entirety of 2011). 
113 Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–147, § 101, 116 Stat. 21, 
22–25 (authorizing 30% bonus depreciation for the end of 2001 and before 2004). 
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late 2003 until the end of 2005, 2008 until the beginning of 2010, and from 2012 
to the present.114  
Allowing a taxpayer to deduct half of the cost of a long-term asset in the year of 
purchase is a significant step towards making the government a  
co-financing investment partner, especially when the purchasing taxpayer can also 
immediately expense part of the purchase price. For example, a taxpayer purchasing 
a $1,000,000 asset that is eligible for immediate expensing and bonus depreciation 
can deduct $800,000 in the year of acquisition, making the government a 
proportionate co-financer of 80% of the investment and a delayed co-financer of 
the remaining 20%.115 Although this falls short of a true partnership in which the 
government supplies its proportionate share of the purchase price entirely in the 
year of acquisition, it is substantially similar. The accelerated depreciation caused 
by §168(k) bonus depreciation and the standard depreciation regime of §168(a) 
cause the full cost of a capital asset to be recovered far before the end of the asset’s 
useful life and trigger large deductions in the year of acquisition.116 E. Cary Brown 
                                                                                                                                                                           
114 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–27, § 201, 117 Stat. 
752, 756–57 (authorizing 50% bonus depreciation from the May 2003 until the end of 2005); Economic 
Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–185, § 103(a)–(b), 122 Stat. 613, 618 (authorizing 50% bonus 
depreciation from 2008 until the beginning of 2010); American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. 
No. 112–240, § 331(a), 126 Stat. 2313, 2335 (2013) (extending 50% bonus depreciation beyond 2012); 
Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014, H.R. 5771, 113th Cong. § 125(a)(2014) (extending bonus 
depreciation from 2014 to 2016); Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114–113,  
§ 143(a), 129 Stat. 2242, 3056 (2015) (extending bonus depreciation from 2015 to 2017);  
id. § 143(b), 129 Stat. at 3057–65 (providing a phase down of the bonus depreciation percentage 
starting in 2018). Under current law, taxpayers may bonus depreciate 50% of the adjusted bases of 
eligible assets.  
26 U.S.C. § 168(k)(1)(A) (2012). Beginning in 2018, the 50% bonus depreciation percentage is set to 
phase down such that it will be 40% for 2018, id. § 168(k)(6)(A) (Supp. III 2012), and for 2019, it will 
be 30%, id. § 168(k)(6)(B). However, bonus depreciation has frequently been extended and made more 
generous. Accordingly, these lower 2018 and 2019 amounts may be increased. 
115 This example assumes that an asset was purchased in 2016 (which makes for round numbers), 
has a five-year recovery period, is subject to the double declining balance method of depreciation, and is 
subject to the half-year convention. This $800,000 first-year deduction reflects $500,000 of immediate 
expensing, id. § 179(b)(1) (Supp. III 2012), plus $250,000 of bonus depreciation, id. § 168(k) (2012  
& Supp. III 2012) (reflecting 50% of the remaining $500,000 adjusted basis), plus $50,000 of regular 
depreciation, id. § 168(a) (2012) (reflecting 20% of the $250,000 basis remaining after immediate 
expensing and bonus depreciation). 
116 Section 168(a) (2012) accelerates tax depreciation relative to economic depreciation through 
several techniques, including by allowing the depreciation of assets that retain or grow in value, see 
Simon v. Comm’r, 68 F.3d 41, 43–46 (2d Cir. 1995), by allowing depreciation over a recovery period 
that is typically far shorter than an asset’s actual economic useful life, see 26 U.S.C. § 168(e) (2012 & 
Supp. III 2012) (converting asset class lives to shorter recovery periods), by treating the salvage value of 
all assets as zero, id. § 168(b)(4) (2012), and by frequently using the  double-declining-balance method 
of depreciation to frontload deductions, see id. § 168(b)(1) (making the double-declining-balance 
method the default method of tax depreciation). 
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recognized that depreciation that is substantially similar to immediate expensing 
can trigger similar partnership effects.117  
 
II.  THE GOVERNMENT’S CHARACTERISTICS AS AN INVESTOR 
 
The government is uniquely situated as an investor. Among all investors, it has 
the lowest cost of capital.118 While most others often find it particularly difficult 
and costly to raise capital during and following recession, the government’s cost of 
capital usually drops during and following recession.119 Among all investors, it is 
also uniquely well diversified.120 While others seek diversification by purchasing a 
variety of the investments that are available to them, the government is naturally 
diversified because, through the operation of tax law, it shares in streams of income 
from labor compensation, streams of profits from asset appreciation, shares of 
privately-held investments, and interests in publically-traded investments.121 
Finally, among all investors, it is uniquely compromised in its ability to pursue its 
investment priorities.122 While others can purchase investments that are aligned 
with their investment priorities, sell these investments when they become 
misaligned, and even appeal to investor protection laws, the government is an 
involuntary investor123 and is not covered by investor protection laws.124 Each of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
117 Brown, supra note 16, at 301 (acknowledging that while full immediate expensing is necessary to make 
the government a full investment partner and neutralize the adverse effect of tax, “[d]epreciation of assets over a 
short period, say, three to five years, would come reasonably close to neutralizing the adverse effect of the tax”). 
Interestingly, taxpayers seem to far prefer increased depreciation deductions in the year of acquisition over 
shortened recovery periods. See, e.g., Eric Zwick & James Mahon, Do Financial Frictions Amplify Fiscal  
Policy? Evidence from Business Investment Stimulus 5 (Nov. 25, 2013) (working paper), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/businessinveststimmahonzwick.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2KX-C75C] (finding 
that “firms only respond to investment incentives when the [bonus depreciation] policy immediately generates 
cash flows.”). Thus, from a taxpayer’s perspective, the government might be a more complete investment 
partner by allowing a larger percentage of cost to be deducted in the year of acquisition rather than deduction 
ratably over a short, three-to-five-year recovery period. 
118 See infra note 136 and accompanying text. 
119 See infra notes 137–140 and accompanying text. 
120 See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Brown, Introduction: What Role Should the Government Play in Insuring 
Private Market Risks?, in PUBLIC INSURANCE AND PRIVATE MARKETS 1, 10 (Jeffrey R. Brown ed., 
2010) (noting “that the government has the unique ability to diversify risk across generations through 
fiscal policy”). But see Shu-Yi Oei, Taxing Bankrupts, 55 B.C. L. Rev. 375, 421 (2014) (“[S]imply 
saying that the government [with its ability to raise revenue through borrowing or through spending 
cuts and/or tax increases on future generations] has superior powers of diversification does not say very 
much about whether the methods of diversification employed are desirable.”). See infra Part II.B., for an 
in-depth explanation of the government’s diversification. 
121 See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 3, at 29 (observing that “the government is a partner in all 
[capital] investments and cannot be excluded”). 
122 See infra Part II.C. 
123 The government is an involuntary investor in the sense that, through immediate expensing and 
accelerated depreciation policies, it takes an indirect investment role without making particularized buy 
and sell decisions. But, it decides which categories of investments are eligible for immediate expensing 
and accelerated depreciation treatment and can change its indirect investments by changing these 
categories. 
124 See infra note 158 and accompanying text.  
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these characteristics informs consideration of the government’s investment 
preferences.  
 
A.  Low Cost of Capital, Especially Following Recession 
 
When federal taxes125 are insufficient to cover the federal government’s 
expenses, the Department of Treasury borrows money by issuing Treasury bills and 
other securities.126 Private parties and foreign governments buy a Treasury 
security,127 providing the federal government with immediate use of the security’s 
purchase price. Typically, while the Treasury security is outstanding, the 
government must pay interest to the holder at a rate that was fixed at the time the 
security was issued.128 When the security matures, the government must repay the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
125 Federal income taxes, payroll taxes, and corporate taxes are the largest sources of federal tax 
revenue. See SOI Tax Stats – Gross Collections by Type of Tax – IRS Data Book Table 6, INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/uac/soi-tax-stats-gross-collections-by-type-of-tax-irs-data-book-
table-6 [https://perma.cc/DFW7-AGVF] (last updated Feb. 14, 2017) (showing that most Internal 
Revenue collections are from business income taxes, individual income taxes, and employment taxes). In 
addition, the federal government imposes a variety of excise taxes and transfer taxes. See id. (showing 
that estate taxes, gift taxes, and excise taxes make up a minority of Internal Revenue collections). 
126 Treasury securities include: Treasury bills (“with maturities ranging from a few days to 52 
weeks”), Treasury notes (“with maturities of 2, 3, 5, 7, and 10 years and pay interest every six months”), 
Treasury bonds (which “pay interest every six months and mature in 30 years”), Treasury Inflation-
Protected Securities (which “pay interest every six months and are issued with maturities of 5, 10, and 
30 years” but “whose principal is adjusted by changes in the Consumer Price Index”), Floating Rate 
Notes (“issued for a term of 2 years and pay interest quarterly” but whose “interest payments . . . rise and 
fall based on discount rates for 13-week Treasury bills), and savings bonds (whose “[i]nterest accrues 
over the life of the bond and is paid upon redemption”). Treasury Securities & Programs, 
TREASURYDIRECT, http://treasurydirect.gov/indiv/products/products.htm [https://perma.cc/2QMJ-
P3T6] (last updated July 27, 2017) (for information on all products except savings bonds); see also 
Comparison of TIPS and Series I Savings Bonds, TREASURYDIRECT, 
http://treasurydirect.gov/indiv/products/prod_tipsvsibonds.htm [https://perma.cc/UYP5-BYS2] (last 
updated Oct. 11, 2012) (for information on savings bonds).  
127 About thirty percent of federal debt is “intragovernmental holdings” borrowed from other federal accounts, 
including the Social Security trust fund, while about seventy percent is borrowed from private parties and foreign 
governments. See Debt Position and Activity Report: Total Public Debt Outstanding as of December 31, 2015, 
TREASURYDIRECT, https://treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/pd_debtposactrpt_1215.pdf [https://perma.cc/SQS7-
DK48] (last updated Nov. 3, 2016); Who Does the U.S. Government Owe Money to?, NAT’L PRIORITIES 
PROJECT, https://media.nationalpriorities.org/uploads/debt_owners_pie_chart_dec_2014_6.11.2015.png 
[https://perma.cc/5D86-LL3R] (last visited Sept. 17, 2017) (showing via graph that as of December 2014, the U.S. 
government owed about 28% of its debt to “[f]ederal [a]ccounts,” about 15% to “[d]omestic [p]rivate [i]nvestors,” and 
about 34% to “[i]nternational [i]nvestors”). 
128 Exceptions are Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) since the interest rates and principal 
repayment amounts are not fixed but adjusted to account for inflation, Floating Rate Notes (FRNs) since 
interest rates are adjusted based on discount rates for 13-week Treasury bills, and certain savings bonds. See 
TIPS in Depth, TREASURYDIRECT, https://treasurydirect.gov/indiv/research/indepth/tips/res_tips.htm 
[https://perma.cc/4SE8-682A] (last updated Jan. 21, 2014); Treasury Securities & Programs, supra note 126 
(discussing logistics of FRNs); I Savings Bonds, TREASURYDIRECT, 
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full face value.129 Accordingly, if the government needs to finance an investment 
and cannot do so through current tax or other revenue sources, it finances the 
investment by issuing Treasury securities.130 This means that the government’s cost 
to raise capital is the interest it must pay to Treasury security holders, which, 
depending on the duration of the loan, is known as the Treasury bill rate, Treasury 
note rate, or Treasury bond rate.131 
Treasury security rates are far lower than the rates of interest that firms must 
pay to their bondholders because the holders of Treasury securities alone need not 
fear that the borrower will be unable to make required payments.132 The U.S. 
government cannot involuntarily default on its debts.133 Since investors can be 
highly certain that the government will not default, they are exposed to little risk 
when they lend money to the government.134 In fact, the Treasury security rate is 
popularly known as the risk-free rate, as it is free from the risk of borrower 
default.135 
                                                                                                                                                                           
https://treasurydirect.gov/indiv/research/indepth/ibonds/res_ibonds.htm [https://perma.cc/V9FT-Y5G9] (last 
updated Sept. 17, 2015) . 
129 I Savings Bonds, supra note 128; TIPS in Depth, supra note 128.  
130 See I Savings Bonds, supra note 128; TIPS in Depth, supra note 128; Treasury Securities  
& Programs, supra note 126. 
131 See generally infra Part II.C. 
132 See Neil H. Buchanan, Is It Sometimes Good to Run Budget Deficits? If So, Should We Admit 
It (Out Loud)?, 26 VA. TAX R. 325, 334 (2006) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Alan S. Blinder, Is the 
National Debt Really – I Mean, Really – A Burden?, in DEBT AND THE TWIN DEFICITS DEBATE 
209, 218 (James M. Rock ed., 1991)) (“Because [U.S.] deficits are financed by issuing debt that is 
denominated in dollars, ‘we can always print as many dollars as we need.’ While this may be ‘wise or 
foolish,’ any ‘fear of default is simply a red herring in the U.S. case.’”). Thus, while there may be 
extremely compelling reasons not to print more money, chiefly fears of dangerous inflation, the ability to 
print money means that the U.S. government cannot involuntarily default on its debts. See id. This is in 
contrast to Greece, where significant government debt was owed in euros, the supply of which is 
controlled by European Central Bank rather than any member country of the Eurozone. See About, 
EUR. CENT. BANK, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/html/index.en.html [https://perma.cc/GKT2-
74ZU] (last visited Oct. 28, 2017). 
133 See Buchanan, supra note 132, at 334. 
134 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4 (“The validity of the public debt of the United States, 
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned.”). 
135 See, e.g., ANDREW B. ABEL, BEN S. BERNANKE & DEAN CROUSHORE, MACROECONOMICS 
115 (7th ed. 2011) (observing that U.S. federal “debt is believed to be free from default risk”); STEPHEN 
A. ROSS, RANDOLPH W. WESTERFIELD & JEFFREY JAFFE, CORPORATE FINANCE 404 (10th ed. 
2013) (“No U.S. Treasury instrument has ever defaulted and, at least at the present time, no instrument 
is considered to be in the slightest danger of future default. For this reason, [the interest rates on] 
Treasury instruments are generally considered to be risk-free [rates].”). Most Treasury securities are 
exposed to the risk that inflation might make the future interest and maturity date payments they 
guarantee less valuable in terms of buying power. Thus, most would be known as nominal risk-free 
rates. See, e.g., Aswath Damodaran, What Is the Riskfree Rate? A Search for the Basic Building Block 
12–13 (Dec. 18, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1317436 
[https://perma.cc/3AHP-VGS5] (follow “Download this Paper” hyperlink) (“[T]he risk free rate used 
to come up with expected returns should be measured consistently with the cash flows are measured. 
Thus, if cash flows are estimated in nominal US dollar terms, the risk free rate will be the US Treasury 
bond rate”). A real risk-free rate might be found by looking at Treasury securities that solve for the risk 
of inflation, Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities. Id. at 14–15 (“An inflation-indexed treasury 
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Because Treasury securities are free from the risk of borrower default and are 
exposed only to the risk that inflation might make future fixed payments less 
valuable in terms of their buying power, Treasury securities rates are low across all 
economies136 and often forced to historic lows during and following recessions.137 
This decline is due to a number of forces, including decreased concern among 
investors about the risk of inflation, increased concern among investors about the 
risk that other investments will post losses and other borrowers will default, and a 
desire to retreat from the market during periods of high volatility.138 This decline 
was observed following the two most recent recessions when Treasury securities 
rates dropped to historic lows and even approached zero.139 As a result, the 
government’s cost of capital following the two most recent recessions was nearly 
negligible.140 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
security (TIPs) does not offer a guaranteed nominal return to buyers, but instead provides a guaranteed 
real return. . . . [as a result, now we can] use the inflation-indexed treasury rate as a real riskfree rate in 
the United States.”). 
136 See, e.g., ROSS ET AL., supra note 135, at 317–18 (estimating that the historic average nominal 
risk-free rate is 3.6% and explaining that investments other than those in Treasury securities must pay 
an additional risk premium). 
137 See, e.g., ABEL ET AL., supra note 135, at 298 (observing that Treasury securities rates are 
“procyclical and lag[ging],” making them low during and following recession); id. at 115 (explaining that 
“Treasury bills, notes, and bonds of various maturities” had rates that “decreased between July 2008 and 
July 2009”); HOWARD J. SHERMAN, THE BUSINESS CYCLE: GROWTH AND CRISIS UNDER 
CAPITALISM 287 (1991) (noting that interest rates tend to be unusually low during and following 
recession); Jean-Pierre Danthine, Vice Chairman of the Governing Bd. of the Swiss Nat’l Bank, Speech 
at the Swisscanto Market Outlook 2014: Causes and Consequences of Low Interest Rates (Nov. 14, 
2013) (citing “low or negative output growth[,] . . . pessimism about future prospects[,] . . . .” 
“heightened uncertainty in global financial markets,” and increased “demand for safe assets like 
government bonds” as causes of low Treasury securities rates during and following recession). 
138 See, e.g., ROSS ET AL., supra note 135, at 317–18. 
139 See ABEL ET AL., supra note 135, at 114–15; Danthine, supra note 137. 
140 See, e.g., ABEL ET AL., supra note 135, at 315; Historical Data for 5-Year Treasury Constant 
Maturity Rate, FIN. FORECAST CTR., http://www.forecasts.org/data/data/GS5.htm 
[https://perma.cc/Z9QM-NYTR] (last visited Oct. 28, 2017). 
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B.  Diversified 
 
The government is uniquely well diversified, even when compared to large 
institutional investors.141 Institutional investors might own a diverse portfolio of 
publically-traded investments. However, through the imposition of tax, the 
government obtains a share of returns on that same portfolio, plus a share of 
income and profit streams from assets that frequently cause under-diversification 
for private investors—income streams, like labor compensation, and profit streams 
from assets, like owner-occupied real property, property used in business 
operations, and privately-held investments.142 
In contrast to private investors, including large institutional investors, the 
government is highly diversified.143 Private investors generally enjoy their own 
individual labor incomes and perhaps a share of the incomes of their family and/or 
household members, own a limited set of assets fully and directly, perhaps own a 
non-diverse set of investments in partnerships or other non-publically traded 
                                                                                                                                                                           
141 See, e.g., Albert J. Boro, Jr., Banking Disclosure Regimes for Regulating Speculative Behavior, 
74 CALIF. L. REV. 431, 453 (1986) (“Given its capacity for deficit spending, the depth of its resources, 
and the ability to diversify risk nationwide, the federal government is the logical insurer of [bank] 
deposits or guarantor of nonfederal insurers.”); Brown, supra note 120, at 10 (noting “that the 
government has the unique ability to diversify risk across generations through fiscal policy”); Frances R. 
Hill, Toward a Theory of Bankruptcy Tax: A Statutory Coordination Approach, 50 TAX LAW. 103, 
148–50 (1996) (noting the “[Internal Revenue] Service’s ability to absorb and spread costs”); David 
Kamin, Risky Returns: Accounting for Risk in the Federal Budget, 88 IND. L.J. 723, 732 & n. 28 
(2013) (emphasis added) (“To the extent that the risk taken on by the federal government is  
undiversifiable—and does not average out across the portfolio of the federal government or the 
American people—then it creates uncertainty as to how much resources people will have at their 
disposal as a result of either government spending or taxation. . . . [But,] to the extent the government 
takes on diversifiable risk, that risk should, essentially, be eliminated as the federal government spreads 
it across the population as a whole—and there should not be a cost associated with it to taxpayers or 
program beneficiaries.”); William T. Plumb, Jr., Federal Liens and Priorities—Agenda for the Next 
Decade, 77 YALE L.J. 228, 244 (1967) (“The [g]overnment . . . is in a better position to self-insure its 
risks than are private parties, for some of whom the failure of even a single major debtor may be 
ruinous.”); Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments and the 
Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1668 (2006) (“It is as if governments diversify their exposure 
to risk through the sheer number of their constituents. The greater the number of taxpayers, the smaller 
the  
per-taxpayer stake in any government action.”); Michael Simkovic, Risk-Based Student Loans, 70 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527, 601 (2013) (“A subsidy is most likely to be welfare-enhancing when 
individual students are risk-averse—for example, because they cannot easily diversify their investment in 
human capital—and the government is risk neutral because it is more diversified. The government 
should ideally view itself not as a mere lender, but rather as a diversified investor in the global 
competitiveness of the United States labor force.”); Rocío Albert López-Ibor & Joaquín Artés-Caselles, 
Bankruptcy Proceedings and Government: Should Bankruptcy Law Grant Privileges to the Treasury? 
15 (German Working Papers in Law & Econ., Paper No. 9, 2003) [https://perma.cc/F7B9-B5CA]. 
142 Compare infra note 213 (providing examples of under-diversification in housing), note 214 
(providing examples of under-diversification in labor and benefits like stock options), and note 215 
(providing examples of under-diversification in business real property), with 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (2012) 
(providing that gross income subject to tax includes income from labor, pass through businesses, rents, 
dividends, and gains). 
143 See Brown, supra note 120, at 10; Plumb, supra note 141, at 244. See generally supra note 141. 
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companies, and often own a larger set of publically-traded investments. In contrast, 
the government is entitled to a share of a far broader and more diverse set of 
income streams. 
Under existing tax policy, the government currently owns a share in the 
overwhelming majority of the United States labor force.144 It collects this share 
through payroll taxes (collected even for low-income earners who do not pay a 
federal income tax),145 as well as federal income taxes.146 Given the federal income 
tax’s progressive rate schedule, as one person’s labor earnings grow, so too does the 
government’s share of those labor earnings, and this growth is automatic.147 
Further, the government currently owns a share in the overwhelming majority of 
the profits produced by closely-held entities—entities whose profits cannot be 
enjoyed by most private and even institutional investors.148 While these entities 
generally are not subject to tax at the entity level, their profits are subject to the 
federal income tax at the owner level.149 Similarly, the government currently owns a 
                                                                                                                                                                           
144 See, e.g., Brad Plumer, Who Doesn’t Pay Taxes, in Eight Charts, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 
2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2012/09/18/who-doesnt-pay-taxes-in-
charts/?utm_term=.1053aa6780d6 [https://perma.cc/K2NV-STWN] (responding to then presidential 
candidate Mitt Romney’s famous comment that forty-seven percent of Americans pay no federal income 
tax by showing that while true (in 2011, 53.6% paid and 46.4% did not pay federal income tax), the 
percentage of nonpayers that year was “abnormally high” given the recession and slow recovery (“it’s 
usually only about 40 percent of U.S. households that aren’t paying [federal] income taxes”), and most 
households that do not pay federal income tax do pay payroll taxes (“60 percent of those who don’t pay 
[federal] income tax are still working and paying taxes for Social Security and Medicare”)); id. (“Another 
22 percent of non-payers are retirees.”); id. (“Only about 7.9 percent of households are not paying any 
federal taxes at all. That’s usually because they’re either unemployed or on disability or students or are 
very poor.”). 
145 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3128 (2012 & Supp. III 2012).  
146 Id. §§ 1–1564; see Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429–30 (1955) (citations 
omitted) (first quoting Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940); then quoting Helvering v. 
Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 U.S. 216, 223 (1937); then quoting Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 9 
(1935); and then quoting Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 166 (1925) (finding the Congress adopted a 
broad definition of income in order to exert “‘the full measure of its taxing power’. . . . And the Court 
has given a liberal construction to this broad phraseology in recognition of the intention of Congress to 
tax all gains except those specifically exempted”).  
147 See 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (imposing taxes according to a progressive rate schedule). In contrast, 
private investors must actively rebalance their portfolios to maintain diversification in response to 
differences in how investments perform. See, e.g., Laurent E. Calvet, John Y. Campbell & Paolo 
Sodini, Fight or Flight? Portfolio Rebalancing by Individual Investors, 124 Q.J. ECON. 301, 302–04 
(2009) (noting that “[i]f the aggregate value of risky securities falls, the average share of risky assets in 
household portfolios must necessarily fall as well” and exploring the extent to which individual 
households rebalance their portfolios to restore diversification). In a sense, the graduated rate schedule 
might mimic the needed portfolio adjustments automatically for the government by automatically 
increasing its share as one taxpayer’s wages, property gains, share of pass-through profits, or other 
income increases and automatically reducing the government’s share in the reverse scenario. 
148 See, e.g., § 701 (imposing an owner level tax on partnership profits); id. § 1366 (imposing an 
owner level tax on S-Corporation profits). 
149 See supra note 148. 
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share in the overwhelming majority of assets held by individuals—assets whose 
growth cannot be shared by most private investors.150 For example, when an 
individual sells an asset for a gain, that gain will be enjoyed by the individual seller 
and the government, but it is not reached by other investors in the market. Finally, 
like other investors, the government has access to the full spectrum of publically-
traded investments.151 In contrast to those other investors, however, the 
government is an “involuntary” investor, so while institutional investors and private 
investors might be dissuaded from being fully diversified because of transaction 
costs, bias, or limited access to the capital that private investors typically need in 
order to acquire ownership interests in investments, the government cannot be so 
dissuaded and will hold ownership interests in investments without an affirmative 
investment decision.152 Indeed, the federal government even takes a share of 
gratuitous life transfers and death transfers for the wealthiest individuals.153  
In addition to current sources of diversification, the government uniquely enjoys 
the ability to diversify risk across generations. Even if a private investor engages in 
active use of insurance markets in an effort to diversify its risk, insurance “[m]arkets 
must be incomplete, because a person cannot engage in risk-sharing trades with 
those who are not yet born. The risks associated with holding capital assets, for 
instance, can be shared with others alive at the same time, but they cannot be 
shared with future generations.”154 In contrast, the government can diversify risk 
over generations by incurring greater deficits in depressions and recessions and 
paying off those deficits with surpluses collected during periods of sustained 
economic growth.155 
                                                                                                                                                                           
150 See, e.g., § 1001(a) (defining gain as “amount realized” minus “adjusted basis”);  
id. § 1001(c) (providing that realized gains must be “recognized”). 
151 See, e.g., id. § 11 (imposing a tax at the entity level on corporate profits); id. § 301(c)(1) 
(imposing a tax at the shareholder level when corporate earnings and profits are distributed to 
shareholders as dividends). Notably, the average effective corporate tax rate is very low, indicating that 
the government may not be getting its “rightful” share of corporate income. To the extent that the low 
average effective corporate tax rate is evidence of evasion, such evasion interferes with the government’s 
diversification. See OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, AVERAGE 
EFFECTIVE FEDERAL CORPORATE TAX RATES 1 (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/Average-Effective-Tax-Rates-2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AGL8-4ETR] (“[T]ax planning, noncompliance, and costly enforcement [are partly 
attributable for the fact that,] . . . [b]ased on data from federal corporate income tax returns for 2007 
through 2011 . . . the U.S. ATR [average effective ‘actual’ federal corporate tax rate] on income earned 
by profitable corporations with over $10 million in assets was 22 percent (when averaged over all firms 
in all years), well below the top statutory rate of 35 percent.”). 
152 See supra note 151. 
153 See 26 U.S.C. § 2001(a) (imposing an estate tax); id. § 2501(a)(1) (imposing a gift tax); id.  
§ 2601 (imposing a generation-skipping transfer tax on transfers to grandchildren and other members of 
distant future generations). 
154 Kamin, supra note 141, at 756 (citing Laurence Ball & N. Gregory Mankiw, Intergenerational 
Risk Sharing in the Spirit of Arrow, Debreu, and Rawls, with Applications to Social Security Design, 
115 J. POL. ECON. 523, 524 (2007)). 
155 Id. 
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The government is uniquely well diversified156 because currently, by operation 
of existing tax law, it owns a share of many income streams and profit streams that 
even the largest institutional investors cannot hope to access, much less 
automatically share in.157 
 
C.  Cannot Pursue Investment Priorities through Sales or Investor Protections 
 
The government’s uniqueness is not limited to advantages like its cheap access 
to capital and extraordinary diversification. The government also has unique 
disadvantages in that it cannot pursue its investment priorities through purchases or 
                                                                                                                                                                           
156 In addition to being uniquely highly diversified in its investments, the government is unique in 
its ability to engage in deficit spending, to respond to cost increases or tax collection deficits in one 
generation through spending cuts or tax increases in later generations, and the government is privileged 
in its ability to collect the returns it is owed. Each of these factors adds to the government’s ability to 
bear risk more easily and cheaply than private actors in the market. See, e.g., id. (“[T]here is good reason 
to believe that the federal government may be able to bear risk more efficiently than the private markets 
by completing insurance markets that the private sector cannot. Perhaps most importantly, the federal 
government may be able to diversify risk across generations—completing an insurance market that 
would exist if generations could actually strike deals with one another.”). Scholars have noted, however, 
that “[s]imply saying that the government [with its ability to raise revenue through borrowing or 
through spending cuts and/or tax increases on future generations] has superior powers of diversification 
does not say very much about whether the methods of diversification employed are desirable.” Oei, supra 
note 120, at 421. For an excellent discussion on when deficit spending is desirable, see Buchanan, supra 
note 132. 
157 A thoughtful and comprehensive article, Taxing Bankrupts, challenges the prevailing notion 
expressed by scholars who believe that tax debts should not receive priority in bankruptcy cases because 
the government can easily diversify against the risk that a tax debt will be discharged. See generally Oei, 
supra note 120. The article argues that: “the government is constrained in its ability to diversify against 
such risk via both substantive tax policy [changes aimed at increasing diversification might come at the 
expense of efficiency, equitability, administerability; might be politically unfeasible; or might unfairly 
shift tax burdens from noncompliant and predominantly middle-class bankruptcy claimants to 
compliant taxpayers including working-class payers of the automatically collected and paid over Federal 
Payroll Tax] and changes in tax administration.” Id. at 375. 
While this author agrees with many of the thoughtful insights in this important piece, at least in the 
context of the government’s investment characteristics and priorities, the appropriate focus for this 
Article is less on the government’s “ability to diversify” and more on the government’s existing level of 
diversification. Currently, and through the operation of existing federal tax law, the government shares 
in the wages of the U.S. labor forces (through payroll taxes on many lower-earners and both payroll 
taxes and federal income taxes on middle- and higher-earners); the appreciation experienced on assets 
whether they are held by individuals, closely-held entities, or publically-traded entities; the operating 
profits of privately-traded entities; and the operating profits of publically-traded entities. No other 
investor has access to many of these income streams, much less current ownership interests in them. 
In contrast to a dispute in the bankruptcy priority literature about whether the government can take 
new, affirmative steps (like raising tax rates) to protect itself against the risk of debtor discharge of tax 
debts through bankruptcy, this Article focuses on the government’s currently unique and high level of 
diversification resulting not from new action but simply by the operation of existing tax law.  
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sales of investments.158 While this observation may be obvious, its implications are 
worth exploring. 
Economists Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller famously created a model to 
determine when firms should undertake investments with risky returns.159 They 
noted that while the question might initially appear to depend on the unique 
characteristics and investment priorities of the firm’s existing shareholders, in fact, 
the question is abstract from these considerations.160 Modigliani and Miller 
proposed an “approach, based on market value maximization,” that asks nothing 
about the investment priorities of existing shareholders and instead asks only, “Will 
the project, as financed, raise the market value of the firm’s shares? If so, it is worth 
undertaking; if not, its return is less than the marginal cost of capital to the firm 
[and it is not worth undertaking].”161 The approach is “entirely independent of the 
tastes of the [firm’s] current owners” because “[i]f any current stockholder disagrees 
with management and the market over the valuation of the project, he is free to sell 
out and reinvest elsewhere, but will still benefit from the capital appreciation 
resulting from management’s decision.”162 Even if a shareholder’s investment 
priorities are inconsistent with a firm’s investment decision, that shareholder’s 
interests are protected as long as the investment’s expected returns exceed the cost 
of capital that the firm must pay to finance the investment.163 This is because the 
excess of expected returns over the cost of capital increases the market value of the 
firm as well as the price of its shares.164 A nominally dissatisfied shareholder will, in 
fact, happily sell out for a profit and reinvest in a manner that better reflects his 
investment priorities.165 
Although a private investor can “sell out and reinvest elsewhere,”166 the 
government cannot—despite the fact that it may act as an investor in a firm’s 
projects by sharing returns, sharing risk, and co-financing projects. Nor does it have 
                                                                                                                                                                           
158 See Cunningham, supra note 3, at 25 (“The only difference between the government’s role and that of 
a limited partner is that the government has no say in either making the investment or terminating it. These 
matters are totally within T’s [taxpayer’s] control.”). Nor does the taxpayer have the ability to exclude the 
government from an investment opportunity. Id. at 27 (“[T]he government is a partner in all ventures . . . [i]t 
cannot be excluded. . . . [This means that] where an investor faces an attractive, but limited, investment  
opportunity[,] . . . the government cannot be excluded from participating in this  
investment[,] . . . [which potentially] prevents the investor from investing as much in this particular venture as 
she would like . . . .”).  
159 See generally Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance 
and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958). 
160 Id. at 264 (“[T]he utility approach has serious drawbacks for normative as well as analytical 
purposes. How, for example, is management to ascertain the risk preferences of its stockholders and to 
compromise among their tastes? And how can the economist build a meaningful investment function in 
the face of the fact that any given investment opportunity might or might not be worth exploiting 
depending on precisely who happen to be the owners of the firm at the moment?”). 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 See id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id.  
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a private investor’s ability to choose in the first instance whether, when, and at 
what price to acquire investments. Rather, because a firm’s decision to invest in a 
capital asset of the firm’s choosing triggers the immediate expensing that makes the 
government a co-investor in that same asset, the firm has the privileged position to 
impose its investment priorities even at the expense of the government’s investment 
priorities. The government is unique in that its dissatisfaction with an investment 
decision cannot be cured through a sale. 
Because the government cannot choose whether, when, how long, and at what 
price to be engaged in investment activities, it is uniquely hindered in its ability to 
align its investments with its investment priorities. Further, the government’s 
investment priorities are not incorporated into market prices because it cannot buy 
investments from prospective sellers who value them less or sell investments to 
prospective buyers who value them more. 
Similarly, the government cannot use most standard legal protections available 
for investors.167 Private investors may sue their investment partners for breach of 
fiduciary duty while the government is owed no fiduciary duty.168 As a result, the 
government’s investment partners can, consistent with the law, engage in planning 
                                                                                                                                                                           
167 For example, investors may protect against managerial abuses by bringing derivative suits if they 
are stockholders, while the government may not bring derivative suits even if tax policy makes it 
descriptively like a stockholder. See, e.g., Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 201 (Del. 2008) (footnotes 
omitted) (“To prevent ‘a failure of justice,’ courts of equity granted equitable standing to stockholders to 
sue on behalf of the corporation ‘for managerial abuse in economic units which by their nature deprived 
some participants of an effective voice in their administration.’”); Cantor v. Sachs, 162 A. 73, 76 (Del. 
Ch. 1932) (“[S]tockholders have a right in equity to compel the assertion of the corporation’s rights to 
redress.”). At least historically, stockholder derivative suits were viewed as powerful tools to combat 
managerial abuses. See, e.g., Daniel J. Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 
74, 75 (1967) (arguing that stockholder derivative suits “have flourished because they serve a basic and 
increasing need in the contemporary economy”); id. at 81 (footnote omitted) (quoting Cohen v. 
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949)) (“Though it is an awkward, costly, and 
intricate mechanism, it continues to be ‘the chief regulator of corporate management.’”). More recently, 
the efficiency and necessity of shareholder derivative suits is subject to serious debate. See, e.g., Robert 
B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented 
Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 134 (2004) (footnote omitted) (describing shareholder derivative 
or securities fraud claims as “the most frequently maligned legal check on managerial misconduct within 
corporations”); E. Norman Veasey & Michael P. Dooley, The Role of Corporate Litigation in the 
Twenty-First Century, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 131, 143 (2000) (footnote omitted) (explaining that the 
corporate governance system “envisions the shareholder suit as a true exception to a system that is 
otherwise built on  
self-governance [that] should be regarded as a remedy of last resort only when the mechanisms of self-
governance, that is board fidelity and the informed exercise of the shareholders franchise, has broken 
down”).  
168 See, e.g., Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934) (Hand, J.) (first citing United 
States v. Isham, 84 U.S. 496, 506 (1873); and then citing Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625, 630 
(1916)) (“Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to 
choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s 
taxes.”). 
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to shift profits to themselves and away from the government. For example, they can 
choose to sell investment assets in years when these sales would minimize their tax 
burdens (otherwise known as the government’s share of gains). While the 
government can challenge a taxpayer for violating tax law, it cannot challenge a 
taxpayer for prioritizing the taxpayer’s investment interests over the government’s 
own interests. The requirements of tax law are unaffected by the government’s role 
as an investor. Tax planning that is legal when the government solely shares in the 
profits of an investment is also legal when the government proportionately shares in 
capital contributions and losses as well as profits. Similarly, even when the 
government has proportionately shared capital contributions, losses, and profits, it 
has no voting rights and no rights to representation. 
Since the government cannot pursue its investment priorities through choice 
over its investments or through use of legal protections applicable to other 
investors, it relies on third-party decision makers to advance its interests.169 In order 
to advance its interests, the government must consider how its investment interests 
align with or diverge from those of relevant decision makers. If a decision maker is 
less diverse or less able to raise capital, the government cannot solve that divergence 
by selling the investment.170 Rather, few methods exist for the government to 
advance its own investment priorities.171 One possible method is to change tax 
policy to advance them.  
 
III.  TAX POLICY CHANGES THAT COULD ADVANCE THE GOVERNMENT’S 
INVESTMENT PRIORITIES 
 
The lawmakers who enacted and expanded immediate expensing and 
accelerated depreciation policies did not set out to advance the government’s 
investment priorities. Indeed, the legislative history does not indicate that the 
government’s investment characteristics or priorities were even discussed.172 Rather, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
169 See Cunningham, supra note 3, at 27 (noting that with regard to its tax policies, the 
“government is a partner in all ventures” and “[t]herefore, the government invests in whatever an 
investor chooses”). Therefore, the government does not affirmatively and individually select what 
investment opportunities it pursues, and must instead rely on its co-partners. 
170 See Cunningham, supra note 3, at 25 (noting that a “difference between the government’s role 
and that of a limited partner is that the government has no say in either making the investment or 
terminating it”); see also supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
171 See supra note 167 and accompanying text. Changing tax policy is not the only method by which the 
government might seek to advance its own investment priorities. The government might use persuasion, 
appeals to civic duty, and direct spending policies. Indeed, the corporate social responsibility literature 
extensively discusses how corporations might be made to advance broader social goals. See, e.g., Reuven S. 
Avi-Yonah, Corporate Taxation and Corporate Social Responsibility, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 3 (2014) 
(arguing that corporate social responsibility might be used to counter corporate inversions and other aggressive 
tax planning and arguing the “only solution is to change the attitude of major U.S. multinationals back to 
where . . . . a tax director of a major U.S. multinational would typically reject aggressive  
tax-motivated transactions as inconsistent with [corporate social responsibility]”). 
172 This conclusion is based on a review of the legislative history from the passage and every 
subsequent extension or expansion of 26 U.S.C. § 168(k) (bonus depreciation) and 26  
U.S.C. § 179 (immediate expensing). 
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lawmakers set out to encourage capital investing, stimulate the economy, and 
facilitate recovery following recession.173 Scholars have debated the effectiveness of 
immediate expensing and accelerated depreciation policies in advancing these goals 
and have empirically tested whether these policies seem to have succeeded or failed 
as tools of general economic stimulus.174 While critically important and useful, 
these tests are difficult to construct and have resulted in ambiguous findings.175 
This Article considers whether these policies might have been used unintentionally 
in the past and whether they might be used more strategically in the future to 
pursue a goal other than general economic stimulus. Maybe they are not solely 
about general economic stimulus. Maybe important features of immediate 
expensing and accelerated depreciation policies are and can even more effectively be 
about encouraging firms to use the government’s investment dollars in ways that 
are particularly profitable for the government, nudging firms somewhat toward the 
government’s investment priorities.176  
When the government is viewed as an investor pursuing its own priorities in the 
market, immediate expensing and accelerated depreciation policies make more 
sense. These policies encouraged increased investing during and following the two 
most recent recessions when Treasury securities rates were at historic lows.177 As a 
                                                                                                                                                                           
173 See, e.g., JANE G. GRAVELLE, DONALD J. MARPLES & MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R43510, SELECTED RECENTLY EXPIRED BUSINESS TAX PROVISIONS (“TAX 
EXTENDERS”) 12 (2015) (“Bonus depreciation was intended for a specific, short-term purpose: to 
provide an economic stimulus during a recession.”); S. REP. NO. 97–144, at 47 (1981) (expressing hope 
that “the more rapid acceleration of cost recovery deductions” would be “an effective way of stimulating 
capital formation, increasing productivity[,] and improving the nation’s competitiveness in international 
trade”); MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A LAW STUDENT’S GUIDE TO 
THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 162 (9th ed. 2002) (“Congress’ stated aim [in allowing 
immediate expensing and accelerating depreciation] was to stimulate investment . . . and with this 
overriding goal in view it simply discarded accuracy of measurement as an objective for the tax law to 
pursue.”); Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and 
Economic Integration of Europe, 115 YALE L.J. 1186, 1225 (2006) (describing immediate expensing 
and accelerated depreciation as our government’s “standard method for combating recessions”); Darrel 
Cohen & Jason Cummins, A Retrospective Evaluation of the Effects of Temporary Partial Expensing 2 
(Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Paper No. 19, 2006), 
https://federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2006/200619/200619pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4MH-R4A2] 
(“To help stimulate short-run economic activity, a tax bill was enacted in March 2002 and subsequently 
expanded in May 2003 that included a temporarily enhanced incentive to invest in business equipment 
and software. This incentive, a form of accelerated depreciation . . . is commonly referred to as 
temporary partial expensing or bonus depreciation.”). 
174 See Morrow, supra note 33, at 488–90 (summarizing recent empirical tests). 
175 Id. 
176 Of course, firms remain free to pursue their own investment priorities alone. Nonetheless, should 
they wish to do so while also wishing to return to a pre-tax position on risk and reward, the government 
might properly leave the burden on them to supply the additional needed capital. See Zelenak, supra 
note 9, at 883–84 (describing how a firm can return to a pre-tax position on risk and reward by putting 
additional capital into an investment). 
177 See ABEL ET AL., supra note 135, at 115; Danthine, supra note 137; see also supra Part II.A.  
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result, the government was able to purchase its share of depreciable assets when its 
low cost of capital made these purchases especially affordable.178 Further, these 
policies encouraged increased risk-taking179 when the appetite for risk was 
atypically low,180 which likely benefited investors generally and  
well-diversified investors especially.181 By encouraging increased investing in 
higher-risk investments during and following recession, existing immediate 
expensing and accelerated depreciation policies seemed to nudge capital investing 
somewhat towards the investment priorities of the government. Still, more could be 
done to align capital investing with the government’s investment preferences. And 
when these changes would also advance traditional tax goals and broader social 
goals, more should be done. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
178 See ABEL ET AL., supra note 135, at 315; Historical Data for 5-Year Treasury Constant 
Maturity Rate, supra note 140; see also supra Part II.A. 
179 For the portion of an investment that a firm must fund using external capital, the firm must 
expect to include a risk premium in the rate of return commensurate with the riskiness of the 
investment. See Morrow, supra note 33, at 472. But, for the portion of an investment that a firm can 
fund using the tax savings from immediate expensing, no risk premium must be paid. Since immediate 
expensing and accelerated depreciation policies allow the firm to pay a risk premium on only part of the 
purchase price of an asset, the firm will take on more risk than it would have if it had to pay the risk 
premium on the entire purchase price. See supra Part I.B. 
180 See, e.g., George M. Constantinides, Understanding the Equity Risk Premium Puzzle 34 (Mar. 
6, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/george.constantinides/documents/Premium%20Essay%202006.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/8VDD-UQCF] (“[T]he risk premium is highest in a recession because the stock is a 
poor hedge against the uninsurable income shocks, such as job loss, that are more likely to arrive during a 
recession.”); id. at 29 (“In economic recessions, investors are exposed to the double hazard of stock 
market losses and job loss. Investment in equities not only fails to hedge the risk of job loss but 
accentuates its implications. Investors require a hefty equity premium in order to be induced to hold 
equities.”); id. at 37 (“[C]onsumers face uninsurable and idiosyncratic income shocks, for example, the 
loss of employment. The prospect of such events is higher in economic downturns and this observation 
takes us a long way toward understanding both the unconditional moments of asset returns and their 
variation along the business cycle.”). 
181 See Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, Getting Incentives Right: Is Deferred 
Bank Executive Compensation Sufficient?, 31 YALE J. REG. 523, 536–37 (2014) (footnotes omitted) 
(explaining the Restricted Equity proposal and how restricted long-term stock options assist in solving 
the incentive for executives to focus too often on short-term effects); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & 
Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1915, 1922 (2010) (“Equity 
compensation arrangements should . . . provide ex-executives with incentives to maximize long-term 
value, not the short-term stock price.”); Patrick Bolton, José Scheinkman & Wei Xiong, Executive 
Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets, 73 REV. ECON. STUD. 577, 580 
(2006) (“[I]f the goal is to ensure the maximization of long-run fundamental value, then one may want 
to not only strengthen corporate governance but also lengthen stock-option vesting periods, lengthen 
director terms, insulate the board of directors more from market swings, and more generally take steps 
ensuring that controlling shareholders (or the board of directors) have a longer-term outlook.”); Alex 
Edmans et al., Dynamic CEO Compensation, 67 J. FIN. 1603, 1605–06 (2012) (suggesting that 
incentives with gradual, long-term vesting prevent short-term thinking and incentivize long-term 
effort). 
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A.  How the Government Might Exploit its Low Cost of Capital 
 
i.  The Government Should Not Seek to Profit by Using its Low-Cost Capital to 
Finance High Risk/High Reward Investments 
 
Although this Article argues that the government should pursue profits based 
on its unique investment characteristics, it should not pursue profits based solely on 
its low cost of capital relative to private investors. It might initially be tempting to 
suggest that since the government has access to a uniquely low cost of capital,182 it 
can use cheap debt to finance investments and keep a greater share of investment 
returns as profits. Further, since private investors must pay higher costs of capital 
when they finance riskier investments, while the government alone can assure its 
lenders that its increased investment risk will not increase the risk of it defaulting 
on its obligations,183 the profit spread that the government enjoys between its low 
cost of capital and its investment returns should only grow as the risk/return level 
of its investing increases.184 Thus, the government might seek to profit by using tax 
policy to encourage higher-risk/higher-reward investing. 
While the observation that the government can uniquely profit from higher 
risk/higher reward investing because it alone can issue Treasury securities to 
finance higher risk/higher reward investments is true in a simple sense, it also 
misses an important part of the picture. As economists warn, this “should not be 
presented as a free lunch.”185 The government can assume investment risk without 
compensating its lenders because the government’s investment risk is not 
transferred to its lenders.186 Other investors shift investment risk to lenders when 
they default on loan obligations.187 In contrast, the government alone retains full 
                                                                                                                                                                           
182 See Morrow, supra note 33, at 500, 511; see also supra note 132, 136 and accompanying text 
(detailing that the government’s cost of capital is uniquely low because the government alone can 
guarantee repayment—even if by printing additional currency to meet its repayment obligations—so it 
need only compensate lenders for the risk-free rate to borrow money, which is historically about 3.6%). 
183 See, e.g., Damodaran, supra note 135, at 6 (“[Securities issued by] even the largest and safest 
firms have some measure of default risk. The only securities that have a chance of being risk free are 
government securities, not because governments are better run than corporations, but because they 
control the printing of currency. At least in nominal terms, they should be able to fulfill their promises 
[to pay back their own currency].”). 
184 Finally, since costs of capital must be paid for the duration of the investment, the government’s 
low cost of capital should make longer-term investments more profitable for the government than for 
other investors. 
185 PETER A. DIAMOND & PETER R. ORSZAG, SAVING SOCIAL SECURITY: A BALANCED 
APPROACH 42 (2004). 
186 See, e.g., Deborah Lucas & Marvin Phaup, The Cost of Risk to the Government and Its 
Implications for Federal Budgeting, in MEASURING AND MANAGING FEDERAL FINANCIAL RISK 29, 
34 (Deborah Lucas ed., 2010). 
187 Id. 
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investment risk, effectively causing current and future taxpayers to bear it without 
compensation.188  
Economists Deborah Lucas and Marvin Phaup provide a helpful example: 
  
[A]ssume that the government borrows $100 to buy $100 in stock and will 
liquidate the entire position in one year. The Treasury securities promise 5 
percent risk free, whereas the stock will return −2 percent in a recession and 20 
percent in a boom. Assuming an equal probability of a boom or a bust, the 
expected return on the stock is 9 percent, a 4 percent premium over the Treasury 
rate. At the end of the year, taxpayers are liable for repayment of the Treasury 
debt, regardless of whether the stock gains or loses value. In a recession, the 
government will be short $7—money that must be obtained from the public 
through expenditure cuts, higher taxes, or increased debt liabilities. In a boom, it 
will be ahead by $15, which again will be passed through to the public through 
changes in expenditures, taxes, or government debt. This shows that the stock is 
not really entirely financed by the Treasury debt. The public serves as the residual 
claimant of the return on the stock minus the Treasury rate; it is as if the public is 
a highly leveraged equity holder in the stock investment. A taxpayer accepting the 
same risk in a private financial transaction would expect compensation equal to 
the levered market risk premium to participate.189  
 
Instead of producing a risk premium without its associated risk,190 the 
government’s use of Treasury securities to finance high risk/high reward 
investments would simply decouple the risk premium (to be retained by the 
government) from its associated risk (to be borne by the public). This Article 
recommends that the government exploit its unique investment opportunities only 
to the extent that doing so benefits the public,191 not to the extent that doing so 
shifts benefits from the public to the government.  
 
ii.  The Government Should Phase In and Phase Out Immediate Expensing 
Automatically Based on Changes in its Cost of Capital 
 
Although attempting to profit based on the government’s low cost of capital 
relative to that of private investors is generally ill-advised, the government is like 
other investors in that it can profit by making purchases when its cost of capital is 
atypically low.192 Accordingly, the government should modify immediate expensing 
and accelerated depreciation policies so that they automatically encourage increased 
                                                                                                                                                                           
188 Id. 
189 Id.  
190 See id. (citation omitted) (“The argument that the government cannot create value by 
exchanging safe for risky claims is an application to public finance of the well-known Modigliani-Miller 
theorem. They show that in the absence of market imperfections, the cost of risk associated with an 
asset depends only on its own characteristics, not on the combination of financial securities used to 
finance it.”). 
191 To a much more limited extent, encouraging investing in certain higher risk, higher reward 
investments—investments that compensate for difficult-to-diversify risk—can create (rather than simply 
shift) value by taking advantage of the government’s uniquely deep diversification. See, e.g., infra Part 
III.B. 
192 See supra Part II.A. 
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investing when the government can cheaply finance its share and withdraw 
incentives when the government can less cheaply finance its share.193 This 
modification could be implemented by making the generosity of immediate 
expensing and accelerated depreciation expressly and automatically dependent on 
changes in relevant Treasury security rates.194 When Treasury securities rates 
decrease, these incentives should automatically become more generous. When rates 
increase, the incentives should automatically become less generous. And in cases 
where other concerns—including concerns about recession or inflation—compel 
competing changes to immediate expensing policies, these default adjustments 
based on Treasury securities rates can be superseded. 
Why would the government want to expand immediate expensing when 
Treasury securities rates are low? It has the same motive as a prospective 
homebuyer hoping to take advantage of low mortgage rates. When a large purchase 
can be financed with debt at a low interest rate, the purchaser will pay far less 
interest over the life of the loan, making the purchase far more affordable. If the 
government has the option to finance its share of capital investments when 
Treasury securities rates are either low or high, it should prefer to do so when rates 
are low.  
The government’s potential benefit from financing its share of capital 
investments with low Treasury securities rates likely exceeds the potential benefit to 
a prospective homebuyer financing a home purchase with low interest rates. Unlike 
a prospective homebuyer, the government does not face as much risk that low 
interest rates will be capitalized into higher prices. In the case of a prospective 
homebuyer, when mortgage rates drop, these reduced rates are available to all 
qualified prospective homebuyers.195 Since low rates make homes more affordable 
to all qualified prospective homebuyers, the demand for homes increases, causing 
either an expansion of supply or, to the extent that the housing supply is 
                                                                                                                                                                           
193 Recall that, currently, immediate expensing under § 179 is permanent at a $500,000 cap that is 
adjusted on the basis of inflation. 26 U.S.C. § 179 (2012 & Supp. III 2012); see also supra notes 105–
106 and accompanying text.  
194 The relevant Treasury security rate will depend on the economic useful life of the asset since 
immediate expensing and accelerated depreciation policies provide government benefits immediately 
upon purchase of an asset rather than spread out over the duration of that asset’s economic useful life. 
Thus, for example, assets with five-year economic useful lives should be assessed based on the rate of 
return on five-year Treasury notes. See, e.g., Damodaran, supra note 135, at 9 (explaining that the 
riskfree rate used to assess a cash flow should match the duration of the cash flow). 
195 See, e.g., Kevin Mercadante, How Low Mortgage Rates Can Be Bad for Homebuyers, MONEY 
UNDER 30 (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.moneyunder30.com/low-mortgage-rates-can-be-bad-for-
homebuyers [https://perma.cc/6C6S-7LF2] (“Generally speaking, when mortgage rates are low, home 
selling is brisk. Property values are often rising, sometimes at speculative levels. But rising rates have the 
opposite effect. Every time rates move up a notch, a whole bunch of borrowers are eliminated from the 
pool of potential homeowners. As the number of borrowers/buyers shrinks, the market cools. Sellers 
begin competing with one another for the shrinking buyer pool by offering discounts and incentives. 
You may actually find house prices are lower in a higher rate environment.”). 
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constrained, an increase in prices.196 Thus, for prospective homebuyers, low interest 
rates can be capitalized into higher prices.197 In the government’s case, this risk is 
not equally present. Through immediate expensing, the government makes an 
investment in a capital asset. If the government uses debt to finance this 
investment, the investment becomes more affordable when the government’s 
interest rate, namely the applicable Treasury securities rate, is low. Other 
purchasers of capital assets cannot borrow at the Treasury security rate, and the 
borrowing rates that are available to those other purchasers are not necessarily 
correlated with the government’s rate, especially following recession.198 Further, 
since the government does not directly decide what capital assets to purchase and at 
what price,199 the prices of capital assets will reflect the borrowing rates of direct 
purchasers rather than those of the government.200 While the benefit of the tax 
subsidy that direct purchasers receive due to immediate expensing201 might partially 
be capitalized into higher prices for capital assets, the benefit of the government’s 
low Treasury security rate will not be capitalized into these prices. 
While motivated by the government’s rational self interest in encouraging firms 
to make capital investments at times when the government can most affordably 
fund its share of those investments, modifying immediate expensing and 
accelerated depreciation policies so that they automatically adjust based on 
Treasury securities rates also advances traditional tax policy goals and broader social 
goals. These suggested modifications avoid some of the rent-seeking and 
retroactive windfalls that plagued prior extensions of immediate expensing and 
accelerated depreciation policies202 and offer the predictability sought by 
taxpayers.203 
                                                                                                                                                                           
196 Id. 
197 See id. 
198 See Morrow, supra note 33, at 510–11 (explaining, for example, that during and following 
recession, risk-free rates at which the government borrows money tend to plummet, while the average-
risk rates at which businesses borrow money stay high because investors flee to safe investments and 
demand higher premiums for bearing risk). 
199 See supra Part II.C. 
200 See supra Part II.C. 
201 Many capital asset purchasers are likely to be in a position to take advantage of immediate 
expensing. However, some may be impeded from taking advantage of immediate expensing because they 
have already reached caps on the benefits, see 26 U.S.C. § 179(b)(1) (Supp. III 2012), or are in a loss 
position, meaning that they do not have trade or business income to offset with immediate expensing 
deductions. See id. § 179(b)(3)(A)–(B) (2012). 
202 See, e.g., David A. Super, Opinion, A Costly and Outrageous Tax Break, N.Y. TIMES  
(Dec. 2, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/03/opinion/a-costly-and-outrageous-tax-break.html 
[https://perma.cc/J4GL-KFN2] (expressing concern that accelerated depreciation policies have been 
expanded retroactively, which is unfortunate since “retroactive tax cuts provide no incentive at all”); 
Megan R. Wilson, Industries Unite in Defense of Tax Break, HILL (Mar. 19, 2015, 4:34 PM), 
http://thehill.com/policy/finance/236342-industries-unite-in-defense-of-tax-break 
[https://perma.cc/2SCH-2RJV] (“Lobbying heavyweights such as Comcast and The American 
Petroleum Institute have already signed up with the Cost Recovery Advances the Nation’s Economy 
coalition (CRANE), which will press lawmakers to keep accelerated depreciation in the tax code.”). 
203 There may be instances when, for good reason, the government does not wish to decrease 
immediate expensing and accelerated depreciation benefits despite its high cost of borrowing, or when it 
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B.  The Government Should Exploit its Diversification by Encouraging 
Investments that Compensate for Difficult-to-Diversify Risk 
  
In an efficient market, investors are compensated for assuming the systematic 
risk inherent in their investments.204 Systematic risk is the uncertainty that 
permeates the market as a whole.205 When the market drops, most investments are 
expected to drop with it, but to different extents depending on whether the 
investment is subject to only systematic risks rather than subject to both systematic 
and unsystematic risks.206 For example, stocks (whose returns depend on the 
profitability of firms) are expected to drop more than bonds (whose returns are 
“guaranteed” even if the firm is not profitable, provided that the firm remains 
solvent). This is another way of saying that stocks are more exposed to systematic 
risk than are bonds and must compensate investors for that comparatively high 
systemic risk exposure.207 
In an efficient market, however, investors are not compensated for taking on 
unsystematic risk in their investments.208 Unsystematic risk is the risk that a 
particular company or a particular industry might suffer independently of the 
market as a whole.209 For example, poor management might cause one company to 
                                                                                                                                                                           
does not wish to increase these benefits despite its low cost of borrowing. Thus, while changes to the 
government’s cost of borrowing should automatically trigger changes to immediate expensing and 
accelerated depreciation policies, these changes should be subject to modification or override. 
204 Kamin, supra note 141, at 730 (footnote omitted) (“Those who bear undiversifiable risk 
generally demand compensation, referred to as a ‘risk premium,’ for doing so, reflecting the cost of 
risk.”). 
205 ROSS ET AL., supra note 135, at 354 (“Uncertainty about general economic conditions, such as 
GNP, interest rates, or inflation, is an example of systematic risk.”); id. (“Sometimes systematic risk is 
referred to as market risk. This emphasizes the fact that [it] influences all assets in the market to some 
extent.”); Kamin, supra note 141, at 730 (footnotes omitted) (“[U]ndiversifiable risk would remain, even 
if markets were efficient [and investors were diversified, because] . . . uncertain outcomes are either 
correlated with one another, or the variance of one outcome is too large relative to the others; as a result, 
combining the outcomes cannot eliminate risk. Economic downturns and booms are often cited 
examples. In these cases, returns across investments will fall and rise together, and combining them does 
not eliminate uncertainty (this is why undiversifiable risk is frequently referred to as ‘market [or 
systemic] risk’).”). 
206 ROSS ET AL., supra note 135, at 355–56 (“While essentially all securities have some systematic 
risk, certain securities have more of this risk than others. The amount of systematic risk is measured by . 
. . beta . . .”). 
207 Kamin, supra note 141, at 730–31 (“[S]tocks tend to pay higher rates of return than relatively 
risk-free government securities because stocks are subject to undiversifiable risk for which investors 
demand compensation . . . .”). 
208 See ROSS ET AL., supra note 135, at 354–64 (explaining how direct investors measure 
unsystematic risks and use diversification in their portfolios to reduce unsystematic risks).  
209 Id. at 354 (emphasizing that unsystematic risk “affects only some specific companies,” which is 
why “we sometimes call it an idiosyncratic risk”). 
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fail even as its direct competitors thrive by gobbling up the failing company’s prior 
market share. Unsystematic risk is often called diversifiable risk because the market 
puts the onus on investors to compile portfolios of sufficiently numerous and varied 
investments to avoid it.210 When investors diversify their investments, they are 
protected from the negative performance of one company or even one industry by 
sharing in the successes of competitors.211 As a result, an efficient market only 
compensates investors for assuming systematic risk, not diversifiable risk.212 
While the principle that only systematic risk should be compensated in an 
efficient market is settled, it is also settled that the United States economy is not a 
fully efficient market.213 For example, contrary to an efficient market’s condition 
that transaction costs should not interfere with the sale of an asset valued more by a 
potential buyer and less by its owner, high transaction costs do interfere with such a 
sale.214 In markets dominated by high transaction costs, we should expect market 
                                                                                                                                                                           
210 Moshe Ben-Horim & Haim Levy, Total Risk, Diversifiable Risk and Non-Diversifiable Risk: A 
Pedagogic Note, 15 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 289, 289 (1980) (“[D]iversifiable risk is the 
risk that can be ‘washed out’ by diversification.”); Systematic and Unsystematic Risk, INST. OF BUS. & 
FIN. (Jan. 29, 2016), http://icfs.com/financial-knowledge-center/systematic-and-unsystematic-risk 
[https://perma.cc/8HWG-X9FF] (explaining that diversifiable risk “can be eliminated by 
diversification”). 
211 See, e.g., ROSS ET AL., supra note 135, at 355 (explaining that “only unsystematic risk” can be 
“diversified away”); id. (stating that systematic risk does not “decrease through diversification”); id. at 
360 (“Unsystematic risk can be diversified away in a large portfolio but systematic risk cannot. Thus, a 
diversified investor must worry about the systematic risk, but not the unsystematic risk, of every security 
in a portfolio.”). 
212 Id. at 365 (explaining that the “capital asset pricing model . . . implies that the expected return 
on a security is linearly related to its beta [the measurement of its systematic risk]”); id. at 378 
(explaining that since unsystematic risk can be eliminated through diversification while systematic risk 
cannot, systematic risk alone is measured by beta, and beta establishes the expected return on a security 
through its linear relationship). 
213 See, e.g., Bulow & Summers, supra note 6, at 22 & n.1 (summarizing the “perfect markets assumptions” 
of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) as including “the absence of transaction costs, limitations on short 
selling, homogeneous expectations, the existence of a safe asset, and competitive behavior”); id. at n.2 (“If these 
[perfect markets] assumptions are not satisfied, the government can increase welfare by serving as a financial 
intermediary. However, if there are economic reasons for the nonexistence of [perfect] markets, such as moral 
hazard problems, there is no presumption that tax policy can increase welfare.”); Robert A. Jarrow & Martin 
Larsson, The Meaning of Market Efficiency, 22 MATHEMATICAL FIN. 1,  
11–16 (2012) (describing what is necessary for there to be a fully efficient market); Efficiency and Beyond, 
ECONOMIST (July 16, 2009), http://www.economist.com/node/14030296 [https://perma.cc/W3WA-JLW5] 
(discussing the various holes that scholars have picked over the years in the “efficient-markets hypothesis”). 
214 See, e.g,, Yoram Barzel, Transaction Costs: Are They Just Costs?, 141 J. INSTITUTIONAL  
& THEORETICAL ECON. 4, 4 (1985) (“[W]hen transaction costs are positive, people are able to gain at each 
other’s expense. In order to minimize the associated loss, people will agree to restrain themselves in various 
ways, and will erect social institutions to impose and enforce the restraints. Such institutions have no significant 
function when transacting is costless.”); R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 387, 390–
91 (1937) (footnote omitted) (“[I]n economic theory we find that the allocation of factors of production 
between different uses is determined by the price mechanism. The price of factor A becomes higher in X than 
in Y. As a result, A moves from Y to X until the difference between the prices in X and  
Y . . . disappears. Yet in the real world, we find that there are many areas where this does not apply [, including 
because] . . . [t]he costs of negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each exchange transaction which 
takes place on a market must also be taken into account.”). See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, 
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prices to less efficiently reflect value.215 Further, in markets where ownership units 
are large and expensive, we should expect investors to be less able to afford diverse 
investments.216 Markets dominated by under-diversified investors present 
opportunities for the government to receive compensation for difficult-to-diversify 
risk that the direct owner bears but the government, as a partial and indirect owner, 
does not. 
For example, some sectors of the real estate market217 have high transaction 
costs and large, expensive ownership units.218 As a result, these sectors are 
dominated by under-diversified investors.219 Just as “[m]any individuals bear 
significant nonsystematic risk by holding much of their wealth in the form of 
owner-occupied housing,”220 many business owners bear significant nonsystematic 
risk by holding much of their wealth in the assets of one business,221 including 
                                                                                                                                                                           
MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 1–40 (1975) (defining and 
explaining how transaction costs interfere with efficient market exchanges). 
215 David A. Lesmond, Joseph P. Ogden & Charles A. Trzcinka, A New Estimate of Transaction 
Costs, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 1113, 1115 (1999) (“[T]he marginal (informed) investor will trade on new 
(or accumulated) information not reflected in the price of a security only if the trade yields a profit net of 
transaction costs. The cost of transacting constitutes a threshold that must be exceeded before a 
security’s return will reflect new information. A security with high transaction costs will have less 
frequent price movements . . . than a security with low transaction costs.”). 
216 See id. 
217 Although this Article uses the term real property, it might more accurately use the term “non-
Class A real property.” See generally Tanya D. Marsh, Too Big to Fail vs. Too Small to Notice: 
Addressing the Commercial Real Estate Debt, 63 ALA. L. REV. 321, 350 (2012) (“Class A assets are 
generally large, newer, and built of high quality materials with a high level of finish. . . . located at the 
most convenient locations in the most desirable markets.”). Class A real properties are likely excluded 
from this analysis because they are predominantly owned by real estate investment trusts (REITs), 
pension funds, equity funds, rental companies, and investment companies, id. at 351, that are likely to 
be well diversified.  
218 Michael J. Sullivan, Steven M. Cassidy & Charles M. Ermer, A Note on the Effect of 
Transaction Costs on Real Estate Investment Returns, 6 J. REAL EST. RES. 113, 113 (1991) 
(“[T]ransaction costs are relatively higher for real estate than exchanged-traded  
securities, . . . . rang[ing] from 6% to 10% of a property’s sale price.”); see Richard B. Gold, Why the 
Efficient Frontier for Real Estate Is “Fuzzy”, 1 J. REAL EST. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 59, 61 (1995) 
(“[E]quity real estate transactions are not typically available for ownership units smaller than a single 
building or parcel of land.”). 
219 See generally Robert J. Shiller & Allan N. Weiss, Home Equity Insurance, 19 J. REAL EST. FIN. 
& ECON. 21, 21–47 (1999) (explaining that many households become undiversified and highly 
leveraged as a result of purchasing a home). 
220 Louis Kaplow, Taxation and Risk Taking: A General Equilibrium Perspective 21 n.32 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3709, 1991), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1663534 
[https://perma.cc/BAF9-EP6C] (follow “Download this Paper” hyperlink). 
221 Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, Founding-Family Ownership, Corporate Diversification, and 
Firm Leverage, 46 J.L. & ECON. 653, 654 n.6 (2003) (estimating that families listed in “Forbes’s 400 
Wealthiest Americans” and controlling shareholders in S&P 500 firms have about 70% of their wealth invested 
in family-owned company stock); Elisabeth Mueller, Underdiversification in Private Companies—Required 
Returns and Incentive Effects (Ctr. for European Econ. Research, Working Discussion Paper No. 04–29, 
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buildings owned and used for business operations.222 Since high transaction costs 
and large ownership shares interfere with the ability of most investors to diversify, 
it is likely that these markets have been forced to accede to the demands of 
investors by compensating them for risk that, while theoretically diversifiable, is not 
practically diversifiable.223 Diverse investors in such markets are positioned to 
receive compensation for risk they do not bear.224 
                                                                                                                                                                           
2004), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/24054/1/dp0429.pdf [https://perma.cc/LJ9C-FYZ8] 
(“Owners of private companies are typically highly underdiversified. In the USA, they have on average 30% of 
their net worth invested in one company. This concentrated investment exposes them to company-specific 
risk.”); see Frank Kerins, Janet Kiholm Smith & Richard Smith, Opportunity Cost of Capital for Venture 
Capital Investors and Entrepreneurs, 39 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 385, 387 (2004) (footnote 
omitted) (“Because an entrepreneur must commit a significant fraction of financial and human capital to a 
single venture, the entrepreneur’s cost of capital is affected by total risk, correlation with risk of the 
entrepreneur’s other investment opportunities, and achievable diversification.”); see also id. at n.5 (citation 
omitted) (“The entrepreneur’s underdiversification is similar to that of a public corporation executive whose 
compensation includes illiquid stock options or an employee whose pension assets include illiquid firm 
equity.”).  
222 See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Fisher, New Strategies for Commercial Real Estate Investment and Risk 
Management, 31 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 154 (2005) (explaining the risk associated with commercial 
real estate and how it can be managed using investment strategies employed for other asset classes); 
Michael J. Seiler, James R. Webb & F.C. Neil Myer, Diversification Issues in Real Estate Investment, 7 
J. REAL EST. LITERATURE 163 (1999) (discussing real estate diversification issues in relation to 
disagreement about the optimal percentage of real estate investment in a mixed-asset portfolio); Sullivan 
et al., supra note 218 (demonstrating that the higher returns in real estate when compared to similarly 
risky investments in corporate or government securities can be partially explained by accounting for the 
high transaction costs associated with real estate); Masaaki Otaka & Yuichiro Kawaguchi, Hedging and 
Pricing of Real Estate Securities Under Market Incompleteness (Jan. 2002) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Yuichiro_Kawaguchi/publication/246363284_Hedging_and_Prici
ng_of_Real_Estate_Securities_under_Market_Incompleteness/links/56d05d4008ae85c823485cd3/Hed
ging-and-Pricing-of-Real-Estate-Securities-under-Market-Incompleteness.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U3ER-T2K2].  
223 See, e.g., ROSS ET AL., supra note 135, at 353–68 (suggesting that the market compensates for 
diversifiable risk in markets in which risk is not efficiently diversified); Dennis R. Capozza & Gregory 
M. Schwann, The Value of Risk in Real Estate Markets, 3 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 117 (1990) 
(suggesting that investors demanding prices for real estate indicates they are being compensated for 
theoretically diversifiable risk); Hui Chen, Jianjun Miao & Neng Wang, Entrepreneurial Finance and 
Nondiversifiable Risk, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 4348, 4351 (2010) (“[D]ue to market incompleteness, the 
entrepreneur will demand an idiosyncratic [diversifiable] risk premium when valuing the firm.”); 
Rebecca S. Rudnick, Enforcing the Fundamental Premises of Partnership Taxation, 22 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 229, 270 n.184 (1993) (citation omitted) (“Evidence suggests that the market compensates for 
unsystemic risk in areas in which risk is not efficiently diversified. For example, a particular venture in 
real estate may have a high degree of unsystematic risk associated with it, and thus the argument that 
the venture could be fully diversified, creating a perfectly balanced portfolio, is inadequate.”); Mueller, 
supra note 221 (“Underdiversified owners should only be willing to invest, if the expected returns are 
high enough to provide a compensation for their exposure to company-specific risk. . . . [E]mpirical 
results show a positive, significant relationship between underdiversification and the profitability of 
companies. . . . [This is likely due to] two possible mechanisms: first, owners can select the projects in 
which they invest such that the expected returns are sufficient to cover the cost of underdiversification 
and, second, if owners are at the same time managers, they can work harder to ensure the success of the 
company.”). 
224 Kerins et al., supra note 221, at 403–04 (explaining how value may be created by shifting 
nonmarket risk to a well-diversified outside investor without affecting the investor’s opportunity cost 
because the investor’s market risk has not changed). 
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In addition to taking advantage of the government’s uniquely deep 
diversification, allowing immediate expensing of a portion of225 business real 
property (which for purposes of this proposal is real property owned and used for 
business reasons excluding land)226 in markets that compensate for difficult-to-
diversify risk would advance traditional tax values and broader social values. First, it 
would reduce the current distortion in favor of assets that receive extremely 
generous depreciation treatment (like equipment and machinery) and against assets 
that receive far less generous depreciation treatment (like business real property).227 
Tax scholars have long worried that this distortion is excessive and interferes with 
otherwise efficient investing.228  
Second, by reducing this distortion, tax rules might better protect the labor 
market. Tax scholars have likewise been concerned that the distortion in favor of 
equipment and machinery is problematic not just because it interferes with efficient 
investing, but because the investing that it most generously subsidizes threatens 
labor markets.229 Equipment and machines replace workers to a far greater extent 
than business real property.230 Thus, a modification of tax law to allow businesses 
that purchase real property for use in their business operations to immediately 
                                                                                                                                                                           
225 Buildings and other real property tend to have far longer economic useful lives than equipment 
and machinery. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 168(c) (2012) (providing a 27.5 year recovery period for 
“residential rental property” and a 39 year recovery period for “nonresidential rental property”), with Jane 
G. Gravelle, Reducing Depreciation Allowances to Finance a Lower Corporate Tax Rate, 64 NAT’L 
TAX J. 1039, 1045 (2011) (noting that most equipment has a five or seven year recovery period). Since 
allowing immediate expensing of buildings and other real property replaces a lengthy recovery period 
with an immediate deduction, while allowing immediate expensing of equipment and machinery 
replaces a far shorter recovery period with an immediate deduction, full immediate expensing of 
buildings and other real property would provide an excessively large benefit—a benefit that threatens to 
distort investment excessively in favor of buildings and real property. See Gravelle, supra at 1047–48 
(explaining that the ratio of revenue gain due to accelerated depreciation is “larger the longer lived the 
asset”). Thus, the immediate expensing rules should aim to allow a portion of a real property investment 
to be immediately expensed with the size of that portion aiming to achieve tax neutrality with machine 
and equipment investments. 
226 Allowing full immediate expensing of real property would be excessive and a better solution 
would be to allow immediate expensing of part of the cost of real property and then to modify the rest of 
the recovery period. The reason that full immediate expensing would be excessive for real property is 
that real property tends to have very long economic useful lives, meaning that replacing a long recovery 
period with immediate expensing provides an especially large benefit to real property when compared to 
replacing a shorter recovery period (for most equipment) with immediate expensing. To achieve 
neutrality in tax treatment of various assets, partial immediate expensing of real property should be 
authorized. 
227 See, e.g., Jane G. Gravelle, Whither Tax Depreciation?, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 513, 525 (2001) 
(“[T]he largest existing distortion in the tax system is the extremely long lives and slow methods of 
depreciation for buildings, particularly non-residential buildings.”). 
228 Id. (encouraging “greater efforts to achieve correct depreciation for long lived assets”). 
229 See generally Gravelle, supra note 227 (evaluating the effects of current depreciation practices). 
230 See Theodore P. Seto, The Problem with Bonus Depreciation, 126 TAX NOTES 782,  
782–83 (2010). 
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expense a portion of that business real property might reduce worker displacement 
and increase employment.  
Finally, by providing capital to help finance investments in markets that 
compensate for difficult-to-diversify risk, the immediate expensing of business real 
property could help reduce existing inefficiencies in the business real property 
market231 and create value on an aggregate basis. As has been explored in the 
context of risk-shifting contracts between under-diversified entrepreneurs and well-
diversified venture capital investors, when diversifiable risk is shifted from an 
under-diversified party to a well-diversified one, value is created and markets can 
become more efficient.232 For one thing, under-diversified actors will predictably 
decline to pursue otherwise efficient investment opportunities if expected 
investment returns fall short of compensating for the diversifiable risk these actors 
hold, even if expected investment returns more than compensate for systemic 
risk.233 However, if diversifiable risk can be shifted to the diversified actor, more 
efficient investments will be undertaken.234 In the context of business real property, 
an under-diversified taxpayer may decline to purchase real property even if that 
purchase would otherwise be efficient if the expected returns on the business real 
property fall short of compensating the taxpayer for the diversifiable risk it will 
hold. Immediate expensing, by which the government effectively co-finances 
investments, could encourage more efficient investing in and pricing of business 
real property.235 
                                                                                                                                                                           
231 See supra note 222 and accompanying text.  
232 See, e.g., Kerins et al., supra note 221, at 404 (“The difference in cost of capital between 
underdiversified and well-diversified investors is an important departure from the Law of One Price. 
Because the entrepreneur’s cost of capital depends on total risk [, diversifiable and systemic], 
opportunities exist for designing value-maximizing strategies for undertaking new ventures.”). 
233 Kerins et al., supra note 221, at 404 (“Holding total investment constant, contracts between 
entrepreneurs and investors can enhance value and can turn unacceptable ventures into attractive ones. 
In particular, contracts that shift risk to investors can reduce the venture’s weighted average cost of 
capital.”); Chen et al., supra note 223, at 4349 (“[N]ondiversifiable business risk generates quantitatively 
significant effects on dynamic capital budgeting, financing, business exits, and valuation of 
entrepreneurial firms.”). 
234 See Ben-Horim & Levy, supra note 210, at 289. If “diversifiable risk is the risk that can be 
‘washed out’ by diversification,” thus leading to efficiency, then an actor (i.e., the government) who is 
diversified will better increase efficiency, because the risk of diversification is made moot by that actor’s 
own diversification. Id.; see also supra Part II.B. 
235 Of course, as is noted in the entrepreneur-venture capital investor context, it is not always 
preferable to shift risk from an under-diversified investor to a well-diversified investor. See, e.g., supra 
note 221. And checks and balances must be in place to ensure that the under-diversified investor 
relieved of risk through risk-shifting does not engage in adverse selection or morally hazardous behavior. 
See, e.g., Kerins et al., supra note 221, at 404 (“Of course, differences in perception between the 
entrepreneur and the investor about the likelihood of success, as well as adverse selection and moral 
hazard, all may favor contract provisions that shift risk to [or maintain risk to] the entrepreneur.”). 
Empirical studies could help determine when immediate expensing of business-use real property ceased 
to reduce market imperfections (the overpricing of property necessary to compensate for difficult-to-
diversify risk) and began contributing to market imperfections (the underpricing of property given that a 
portion of the purchase price is provided by the government without the government being compensated 
for the risk-level of the investments). Even in the absence of empirical studies, checks and balances on 
moral hazard could be implemented, including the reforms suggested in paragraphs C.1 and C.2 below 
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C. How the Government Should Mitigate its Inability to Pursue Investment 
Priorities through Sales or Investor Protections 
 
When tax policies make the government descriptively less like a taxing entity 
and more like a full investment partner, and when that investor role is 
acknowledged, then the current tax rules regarding debt-financing of immediately 
expensed property are exposed as nonsense. 
 
i.  The Government Should Refuse to Share in Debt-Financing Charges on 
Expensed Property 
 
In the standard world of economic partnerships, when one partner contributes 
cash for her share of an investment while the other partner debt-finances his share, 
the debt-financer must pay all charges associated with the debt. Returning to the 
example from Part I.C., when one partner contributes $20,000 cash to fund 20% of 
the purchase price for a $100,000 asset while the other partner debt-finances his 
$80,000 contribution, the 80% partner is responsible for 100% of the interest. The 
80% partner could have avoided paying interest by contributing cash instead of 
taking out an $80,000 loan. But with the decision to debt-finance comes the 
obligation to pay all associated interest. If the 80% partner demanded that the  
20% partner pay 20% of the interest, the 20% partner would properly refuse.  
Recall from Part I.C., however, that when the government allows an 
investment to be immediately expensed, it is like a 20%236 partner who contributes 
cash (in the form of tax savings provided in the year of purchase) for its 20% share 
of the investment. Unfortunately, the government’s neglect to see itself as a 20% 
investment partner means that instead of requiring the debt-financing partner to 
pay 100% of the interest, the government effectively pays 20%.  
Under current tax law, when a firm pays interest on a debt incurred to purchase 
a capital asset, it can deduct that interest regardless of whether the government 
already effectively purchased its share of the asset through immediate expensing.237 
The deduction of interest causes the government to pay the amount of interest 
times the firm’s marginal tax rate (here 20%) while causing the firm to pay only the 
amount of interest times (1 – the firm’s marginal tax rate) (here 80%).238 If the 
government wished to change this anomaly and act like a typical investment 
                                                                                                                                                                           
(limiting the interest on debt-financed property that is eligible for deduction and prohibiting purchasers 
of immediately expensed property from using the portion of that property effectively purchased by the 
government as collateral for a loan). 
236 In this section, it is assumed that the taxpayer’s marginal rate is 20%. If the taxpayer’s marginal 
rate is 35%, then the government will be like a 35% partner in that it will contribute 35% of capital and 
share 35% in losses and profits. 
237 See Brown, supra note 16, at 309–10. 
238 See, e.g., id. 
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partner would, it should allow the deduction of interest only to the extent that it is 
attributable to the unrecovered cost of the asset.239 If an asset has been immediately 
expensed, meaning that the government has purchased its full share, the 
unrecovered cost is zero and no interest should be deductible. If an asset is still 
being depreciated, meaning that the government is still purchasing its share, then 
only the portion on which the government is still paying its share should trigger 
interest deductions. 
This change, while motivated by the government’s desire not to be exploited as 
an investment partner, also advances traditional tax policy goals. A major goal of 
tax policy is to prevent tax arbitrage, the creation of profits for a taxpayer not based 
on the pre-tax economic profitability of a transaction, but based purely on the 
transaction’s tax benefits.240 Scholars have long lamented that a taxpayer’s ability to 
borrow in order to finance the acquisition of a tax-preferred asset and then to 
deduct the interest on that borrowing is a troubling and common source of tax 
arbitrage.241 In turn, this tax arbitrage opportunity undermines economic stability 
by encouraging purchasers to borrow heavily and repay slowly.242  
Another major goal of tax policy is to advance horizontal equity by treating similarly 
situated taxpayers similarly.243 Current rules allowing the deduction of interest paid on debt-
financed, immediately expensed property undermine this goal.244 According to current law, 
§ 265 prevents taxpayers from deducting costs (including interest and other debt-financing 
costs) of earning income when the income earned is formally exempt from tax.245 Thus, if a 
taxpayer debt-finances the purchase of an exempt municipal bond, § 265 prevents that 
taxpayer from deducting any interest.246 However, while the income produced by 
                                                                                                                                                                           
239 The unrecovered cost of an asset is the initial cost of the asset less any depreciation deductions 
that have already been taken. 
240 See, e.g., Geier, supra note 87, at 25 (“The anti-tax-arbitrage value discourages the creation of 
profit from the Treasury itself . . . .”); id. at 26 (“The income-tax value stands for the proposition that 
consumption-tax treatment should not be allowed absent a clear indication by Congress that such 
treatment was intended or unless the income-tax value is outweighed by values of administrative 
convenience if the distortion is minimal.”). 
241 See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, The General Theory of Tax Avoidance, 38 NAT’L TAX J. 325 
(1985); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Accelerated Capital Recovery, Debt, and Tax Arbitrage, 38 TAX LAW. 
549 (1985); Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin Hassett, Recent U.S. Investment Behavior and the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986: A Disaggregate View (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3626, 1991).  
242 See, e.g., Dimitri B. Papadimitriou & L. Randall Wray, Minsky’s Stabilizing an Unstable 
Economy: Two Decades Later, Introduction to HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE 
ECONOMY, at xi, xxiv (McGraw-Hill 2008) (1986) (attributing the recent crisis in “the U.S. financial 
sector” in part to policies that “expanded the availability of credit . . . . [and] fueled a debt frenzy and 
[encouraged] greater leveraging”); infra note 257. 
243 James Repetti & Diane Ring, Horizontal Equity Revisited, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 135, 135–36 
(2012) (footnote omitted) (“Horizontal equity (HE) is defined to mean that equals should be treated 
alike.”). But see generally Repetti & Ring supra (identifying difficulties with the process of determining 
which taxpayers should be deemed similarly situated and critiquing the concept of horizontal equity in 
light of that difficulty). 
244 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 265 (2012); Brown, supra note 16 (analyzing the impact of “full loss 
offsets” and “one-year depreciation,” including the substantial costs this system imposes).  
245 26 U.S.C. § 265(a)(2). 
246 Id. 
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immediately expensed property is functionally exempt from tax under the E. Cary Brown 
theorem, it is formally subject to tax.247 For example, if a taxpayer’s marginal rate is 20%, 
then the imposition of tax means that the government collects 20% of the profits from a 
taxpayer’s capital asset. While the 20% of profits is formally a tax, when viewed in 
connection with the government’s earlier contribution of 20% of the capital used to acquire 
the asset, a contribution which was provided through the immediate expensing deduction, it 
is more properly regarded as a fair return on the government’s investment. The profits from 
immediately expensed property are formally taxed but functionally  
tax-exempt.248 Thus, § 265 does not prevent the deduction of interest on debt-financed, 
immediately expensed property.249 Accordingly, when a taxpayer debt-finances the purchase 
of property that he then immediately expenses, he is treated dissimilarly to a similarly 
situated taxpayer who debt-finances the purchase of a formally tax-exempt investment.250 
Even if the government’s investment self-interest is the impetus to solve the 
problematic treatment of debt-financed, immediately expensed property, broader 
tax policy, and economic interests are also advanced. 
 
ii.  The Government Should Refuse to Allow Full Use of Expensed Property as 
Collateral for Debt. 
 
In the standard world of economic partnerships, when one partner (like the 
20% partner above) contributes cash for his share of a capital acquisition, and the 
other partner (like the 80% partner above)  
debt-finances his share, the debt-financer is not allowed to use the entire property 
as collateral for a loan; rather, he is only allowed to use the portion of the property 
he owns (80% in the example above). This treatment should inform the 
government/taxpayer partnerships created by immediate expensing rules. After a 
taxpayer has purchased and immediately expensed a capital asset, the taxpayer is the 
titleholder for the entire property. But, the government is the beneficial owner of a 
                                                                                                                                                                           
247 Hanna, supra note 87, at 685 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting E. Cary 
Brown, Business-Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, in INCOME, EMPLOYMENT AND 
PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ALVIN H. HANSEN 300, 314 (1948), reprinted in AMERICAN 
ECON. ASS’N, READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 525, 536 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl 
S. Shoup eds., 1959)) (“Dr. Cary Brown wrote that ‘[i]f [expensing of investments is] applied to debt-
financed assets [along with deduction of interest payments], it would raise investment incentives above 
their pretax level.’ In other words, expensing coupled with an interest deduction on debt-financed 
investments yields an effective tax rate of less than zero. If the tax system were to permit full expensing 
of investments, it appears that the issue of debt-financed investments will need to be addressed. . . . As a 
result, it would probably be unwise to retain a full interest deduction and also allow expensing of 
investments.”). 
248 See Brown, supra note 16, at 309. 
249 See 26 U.S.C. § 265. 
250 Since the formal tax exemption of investments (including in retirement accounts and municipal 
bonds) is meant to convey the most favorable treatment, this is a problematic outcome. 
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portion equal to the taxpayer’s marginal rate (say 20%) in the sense that the 
government contributed 20% of the capital for the purchase, shares 20% in losses, 
and is entitled to 20% of profits. 
The government’s beneficial ownership share in an immediately expensed asset 
arises because the government provides capital in the form of tax savings equal to 
the cost of the asset multiplied by the taxpayer’s marginal rate. Thus, for assets 
purchased and immediately expensed by sole proprietorships, the government’s 
beneficial ownership share is the sole proprietor’s marginal tax rate. For 
corporations, it is the entity’s marginal rate. For partnerships and other pass-
through entities, it is the weighted average marginal tax rate that the owners pay on 
partnership income.251 Regardless, the government’s beneficial ownership interest 
should not be disregarded, and the debt-financer’s ownership should not be treated 
as complete for purposes of collateralizing the debt-financer’s loan.252  
One might initially assume that it makes little difference to the government 
whether the debt-financer uses his 80% share in the property or the entire property 
as collateral for a loan. Indeed, use of the entire property might decrease the 
interest rate that the debt-financer is required to pay, which might increase the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
251 For partnerships with a small number of identifiable owners, the weighted average marginal tax 
rate on those owners’ partnership income would be the most accurate estimate of the government’s 
beneficial ownership interest in an immediately expensed asset. However, for many partnerships with 
broad or “opaque” ownership (including circularly owned partnerships), this weighted average may be 
too difficult to determine at the time the asset is purchased, immediately expensed, and made subject to 
a security interest. See Michael Cooper et al., Business in the United States: Who Owns It and How 
Much Tax Do They Pay? 3 (Office of Tax Analysis, Working Paper No. 104, Oct. 2015), 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/WP-104.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WF69-EN8Y]. Accordingly, a best guess figure of 15% should be used, meaning that 
partnerships should only be allowed to subject up to 85% of immediately expensed assets to a security 
interest. Cf. id. at 4 (estimating average partnership income tax at 15.9%). This best guess figure is 
based on the Office of Tax Analysis’s most recent estimate of “the average income tax rate on income 
earned in the partnership sector” of 15.9%. Id. Readers may be surprised that this average rate is so low, 
and it is for several reasons.  
First, capital gains and dividend income, which are taxed at preferred rates, amount to 45% of 
partnership income. . . . Second, tax exempt and foreign entities earn roughly fifteen percent of 
partnership income and pay tax rates below 5%. Third, unidentifiable entities and circular partnerships 
pay an estimated tax rate (10.6%) that is one-third lower than the average tax rate on partnership 
income overall. The relative flexibility in the allocation of income and deductions among partners can 
also combine to make the average tax burden on partnerships relatively low.  
Id. The use of a best guess estimate for partnerships is appropriate since determining the weighted 
average marginal tax rate of a particular partnership’s owners would be difficult, especially at the time an 
asset is purchased and immediately expensed. See id. at 3. However, this best guess estimate should be 
updated as more recent data on partnership tax rates becomes available and should be used as a 
presumption that is rebuttable with proof that a particular partnership is associated with a lower average, 
because, for example, most of its owners are tax exempt entities.  
252 Because immediate expensing is elective, see infra note 278, tax law should be modified to make 
a consequence of this election that the taxpayer cannot subject to a security interest the government’s 
beneficial share of the asset. For example, the immediate expensing provision should define eligible asset 
to exclude assets that are subject to security interests over the government’s beneficial share whether 
defined by the entity’s marginal tax rate (for corporations), the owner’s marginal tax rate (for sole 
proprietorships) or the best guess presumed figure of 15% (for partnerships and other pass through 
entities). See supra note 251 (explaining these rates). 
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capital investing that immediate expensing aims to stimulate.253 However, this 
misses an important point about how the government is situated as an investor. 
Unlike other investors, the government does not make affirmative decisions about 
what assets to buy and at what price.254 If a taxpayer makes a capital investment and 
immediately expenses it, then the government automatically becomes a partner in 
that investment, proportionately sharing in whatever price the taxpayer agrees to 
pay.255  
Since the government does not participate in decisions about what assets to 
purchase and at what price, it has a particularly compelling interest to avoid 
investments in overpriced assets. As to asset purchases that are debt-financed, the 
government can assert this interest by taking advantage of the potential check on 
purchase decisions by prospective lenders. If prospective lenders deem the debt-
financed portion of the property (above 80%) to be insufficient to secure the debt 
(above $80,000), then they can decline to lend and potentially prevent the purchase 
of an overpriced property. In contrast, if the entire $100,000 value can be used to 
secure a debt of $80,000, this potential check is forfeited. The government should 
modify immediate expensing policies so that these policies allow taxpayers to use 
only their portions of expensed property as collateral for their loans.256 
While motivated by the government’s investment considerations and desire to 
use third-party valuation experts (prospective lenders) to mitigate the risk of 
automatically becoming a part-owner in imprudent investments, this policy would 
have the benefit of discouraging risky borrowing, which threatens the stability of 
the economy as a whole.257  
                                                                                                                                                                           
253 But see Elizabeth Warren, Memorandum to the Council of the American Law Inst. (Apr. 25, 
1996), in LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 
805, 807 (2d ed. 1998) (questioning whether prohibiting a portion of a debtor’s assets from being 
secured would necessarily “constrict commercial lending” since “much commercial lending is not based 
on the liquidation value of the assets, but is based instead on the ability to tie the debtor up and fence it 
off from other competing lenders”). 
254 See supra note 158 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 86, 168. 
255 See Brown, supra note 16, at 309–10; see also supra note 158. The same might be said of other 
minority partners, but unlike other minority partners who can express their disagreement with a firm’s 
investment decisions by selling their ownership interests, the government has no exit opportunity. See 
Cunningham, supra note 3, at 27 (noting the government “cannot be excluded”). 
256 The taxpayer’s portion of an immediately expensed asset is the percentage of the asset equal to 
100% minus the taxpayer’s marginal rate. See Brown, supra note 16.  
257 See, e.g., Andrew Velarde, Hearing Weighs Distortion Elimination, Capital Expenditures, 151 
TAX NOTES 1157, May 30, 2016, LEXIS, 2016 TNT 101–1 (noting that “increased reliance on debt 
[makes firms more susceptible to “the risk of financial distress”] and makes the broader economy more 
susceptible to severe downturns”). 
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Further, because this policy would discourage258 a portion of business assets 
from being secured, it would better protect the interests of tort claimants, wage 
claimants, environmental claimants, trade claimants, and other involuntary and 
unsecured creditors in the event that a business becomes distressed.259 Many 
bankruptcy scholars lament that these “various rivals of secured creditors”260 are 
insufficiently protected in the existing regime, which gives full priority to secured 
creditors.261  
In 1996, prominent scholars in bankruptcy and secured transactions law agreed 
that the rivals of secured creditors needed and deserved more protection, especially 
given that their interests were nonconsensually subordinated (subordinated by 
agreements between debtors and prospective secured creditors without their 
involvement or consent).262 Scholars proposed that certain debtor property should 
be “carved out” of the full priority regime so that it would be available to unsecured 
creditors.263 Then-Professor and Vice President of the American Law Institute, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
258 I use the term discourage rather than a term like prevent because immediate expensing only 
occurs at the taxpayer’s election. See infra note 278 (providing statutory bases for elections in and out of 
accelerated depreciation). 
259 See, e.g., Warren, supra note 253, at 806 (“When the secured creditors encumber everything a 
debtor owns, the debtor’s other creditors—particularly the trade creditors, the tort victims, employees, 
and the environmental claimants—are unable to reach the debtor’s assets even when they can win a 
judgment against a debtor.”). 
260 This phrase is borrowed from Former Director of the American Law Institute, Geoffrey Hazard, 
who, in a foreword to a 1996 discussion draft of Article 9, wrote that “the proper legal regime through 
which to protect various rivals of secured creditors” was not in Article 9 but “in the law of bankruptcy.” 
UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE REVISED ART. 9, foreword at xv (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 
1996). 
261 See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process 
in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862 (2014); Kenneth N. Klee, Barbarians at the Trough: 
Riposte in Defense of the Warren Carve-Out Proposal, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1466 (1997); id. at 1468 
(footnotes omitted) (applauding then-Professor Elizabeth Warren’s proposal to the American Law 
Institute’s Drafting Committee that “Article 9 be amended to dedicate a portion of the secured party’s 
collateral to repayment of judicial lien creditors” since the proposal would counter a flaw of full priority 
to secured creditors that it “captures values that belong to involuntary and less sophisticated creditors”); 
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1891 (1994) (“Security 
tends to misallocate resources by imposing on unsecured creditors a bargain to which many, if not most, 
of them have given no meaningful consent. It is an institution in need of basic reform.”); Elizabeth 
Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information: The Article 9 Full Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1373, 1376 (1997) (“The justification for contractual priority [by which a prospective lender 
and a prospective debtor agree by contract that the lender will have a security interest in the debtor’s 
property, giving the prospective lender rights that take priority over third parties not present for the 
negotiation] remains, at best disputed, and at worst, thoroughly debunked.”); id. at 1384 (footnote 
omitted) (advocating a system in which “neither wage claimants nor tort claimants wait behind secured 
lenders to recover for their injuries”); id. at 1389 (critiquing the system of full priority for secured 
creditors because it “directs resources away from creditors who are involuntary, underrepresented, and 
least able to spread their losses . . . [and directs those resources] toward lenders who are entirely 
voluntary, best able to protect their rights, and best able to spread their risks among numerous 
projects”). 
262 UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE REVISED ART. 9, foreword (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 
1996); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in 
Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 870 (1996); Warren, supra note 261, at 1374. 
263 See Warren, supra note 261; see also Klee, supra note 261. 
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Elizabeth Warren proposed to the ALI Drafting Committee that “Article 9 [of the 
Uniform Commercial Code] be amended to dedicate a portion [20%] of the 
secured party’s collateral to repayment of judicial lien creditors.”264 Professors 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried similarly argued that some portion of a 
secured party’s collateral should be carved out—and treated as though it was 
unsecured—so that it could be made available to unsecured and involuntary 
creditors.265 However, they proposed that the carve out should apply only in 
bankruptcy and should thus be enacted as a modification to bankruptcy law rather 
than Article 9.266 These proposals earned significant support.267  
Despite significant support for carve-out proposals, “[s]ecured creditors, their 
attorneys, and their sympathizers in academia . . . responded with predictable 
outrage.”268 Among their objections were four contentions that are helpfully 
answered if the desired protection for unsecured creditors is provided not through 
an amendment to bankruptcy law or to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, but through an amendment to tax law.269 Tax law could provide that in order 
to be eligible for immediate expensing, an asset may be used as collateral for a loan 
only to the extent of its value times (1 – the taxpayer’s marginal rate).270 
Before this potential tax solution is explored, recall that through immediate 
expensing the government provides capital towards an investment equal to the cost 
                                                                                                                                                                           
264 Klee, supra note 261, at 1468 (footnote omitted); see also LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 
253, at 805–08. 
265 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 262, at 866 (“[W]e believe that full priority is unlikely to be the 
most efficient rule for allocating value between secured and unsecured creditors. We therefore will 
consider as alternatives to the rule of full priority . . . bankruptcy priority rules that would reduce or 
eliminate the inefficiencies we identify by according only partial priority to secured claims. . . . [One rule 
is a] partial-priority rule [called the ‘fixed-fraction priority rule’ that] would treat a fixed fraction of every 
secured claim as an unsecured claim, rendering all secured creditors at least partially unsecured.”); id. at 
909 (“Under this rule, a fixed fraction of a secured creditor’s secured claim would continue to be treated 
as a secured claim, and the remainder would be treated as an unsecured claim. Thus, under a 75% fixed-
fraction rule, 75% of a secured claim would be given full priority over unsecured claims, and the 
remaining 25% would become an unsecured claim.”); id. at 910–11 (stating that “a fixed-fraction 
priority rule would certainly be preferable to the currently prevailing de facto rule of partial priority” 
because it would at least partially mitigate the unfairness and inefficiency created by the nonconsensual 
subordination of involuntary and unsecured creditors). 
266 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 262 (analyzing alternatives to the rule of full priority in 
bankruptcy).  
267 See supra note 261 (describing some of the scholarly support for carve-out provisions). 
268 Klee, supra note 261, at 1469. 
269 Id. at 1476–79. 
270 Again, the implementation of this policy would be more complicated for partnerships and other 
pass-through entities since they do not receive tax savings based on a single,  
entity-level marginal tax rate. However, it could be implemented using the weighted average marginal 
tax rate of the entity’s owners or, if that was too difficult, a best-guess estimated rate. See supra note 251 
and accompanying text, for further discussion. 
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of the investment times the taxpayer’s marginal rate.271 The government effectively 
purchases a percentage of the asset equal to the taxpayer’s marginal rate.272 After 
putting that tax savings towards the purchase, the taxpayer must still finance the 
cost of the asset times (1 – the taxpayer’s marginal rate), and thereafter effectively 
owns a percent of the asset equal to (1 – the taxpayer’s marginal rate).273 When the 
government’s up-front investment is acknowledged, it paves the way to  
tax-based protections for unsecured creditors that respond to critiques levied when 
similar protections were sought through changes to bankruptcy law and Article 9. 
First, “[c]ritics attack[ed] the [prior Article 9 carve-out] Proposal as an 
unwarranted regulation of the free market, alienability of property, and freedom of 
contract. Some even suggest[ed] that the Proposal raise[d] Fifth Amendment 
takings issues.”274 While these attacks were thoughtfully countered at the time,275 
they are undermined further still if the carve-outs protecting unsecured and 
involuntary creditors do not apply automatically to some portion of a debtor’s entire 
estate, but apply only to property that the debtor previously elected to immediately 
expense—in other words, property that the debtor did not effectively purchase and 
does not effectively own. When the government is acknowledged as an investor in  
immediately-expensed assets to the extent of the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate, the 
idea that the taxpayer could use the government’s share as collateral or that a 
prospective lender could take a security interest in that share without the 
involvement or consent of the government takes on the flavor of conversion. That 
the government’s property might later be distributed to the taxpayer’s creditors is 
surprising enough, let alone that it might be distributed to those creditors that the 
government is least interested in protecting. 
Second, critics argued that “the debtor should be able to determine without 
governmental restraint whether to incur credit.”276 Again, at the time, advocates of 
carve-outs thoughtfully responded that this freedom of contract argument ignored 
that contracts between debtors and secured creditors are atypical in that they allow 
debtors and secured creditors to subvert the interests of non-contracting parties.277 
Still, this argument is even more successfully countered when the government-as-
investor perspective is brought to bear. What authority can a taxpayer claim to have 
to encumber the government’s property? Indeed, the government does not just have 
the right to restrain uses of its property for collateral; it should have full control 
over any decisions about how the purchase of its property should be financed. If the 
taxpayer, who makes the decision to purchase an asset, prefers to avoid this 
involvement by the government, it may elect not to immediately expense property 
                                                                                                                                                                           
271 See Brown, supra note 16, at 309–10. 
272 Id. 
273 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 79; see also Brown, supra note 16, at  
309–10. 
274 Klee, supra note 261, at 1476 (footnotes omitted). 
275 Id. at 1476–77.  
276 Id. at 1476. 
277 Id. 
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and instead capitalize and gradually depreciate it.278 However, once the taxpayer 
elects to immediately expense an investment, it accedes to government involvement 
in that investment. 
Third, critics contended that prior carve-out proposals, including the Elizabeth 
Warren proposal to treat 20% of property as though it was unsecured, were 
arbitrary.279 At least one proponent admitted, “[o]f course, the Proposal’s selection 
of 20% is arbitrary,” but defended it on the grounds that it was “[i]n no way . . . 
unreasonable or unprecedented.”280 Again, the claim of arbitrariness might always 
have been flimsy. But, since prior  
carve-out proposals were not enacted, it is helpful that the  
government-as-investor perspective answers this critique, too. Policymakers hoping 
to better protect unsecured and involuntary creditors need not choose between the 
20% proposed by Elizabeth Warren or the 25% discussed by Lucian Arye Bebchuk 
and Jesse M. Fried.281 To the contrary, when a taxpayer elects to immediately 
expense a long-term asset, the government invests in that asset to the extent of the 
taxpayer’s marginal tax rate.282 Accordingly, the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate at the 
time the asset is purchased establishes what the government owns and therefore 
what the taxpayer ought to be prevented from collateralizing. 
Finally, critics argued that prior carve-out proposals, including the Warren 
proposal, “will not be adopted as a uniform state law. Therefore, secured creditors 
will force debtors to reincorporate in states that refuse to adopt the Proposal. This 
will create a race to the bottom and discourage legislatures from adopting the 
Proposal.”283 Even proponents of the prior carve-out proposal acknowledged that 
“[t]he uniformity concern is an important issue under existing law” since adoption 
of the UCC varies between states, meaning that “current commercial law is 
nonuniform.”284 They suggested that “[t]o the extent commercial law is 
nonuniform, perhaps it should be federalized. That way, Congress could use the 
Commerce Clause to enact uniform commercial laws that balance commercial law 
and bankruptcy law issues.”285 For those policymakers who prefer to maintain the 
current scope of state authority over commercial and bankruptcy law, the 
government-as-investor perspective might again be helpful. The federal 
government need not impose a uniform law of secured transactions or a uniform 
                                                                                                                                                                           
278 Immediate expensing and bonus depreciation are elective provisions. See 26 U.S.C. § 179(a) 
(2012) (providing an election in to immediate expensing treatment); id. § 168(l)(3)(D) (providing an 
election out of bonus depreciation treatment). 
279 Klee, supra note 261, at 1477. 
280 Id. 
281 See supra notes 264–265 (discussing the Warren and Bebcuck and Fried proposals).  
282 See Brown, supra note 16, at 309–10. 
283 Klee, supra note 261, at 1478 (footnote omitted). 
284 Id. at 1478–79.  
285 Id. at 1478 (footnotes omitted). 
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law of bankruptcy. To the contrary, it can offer a federal tax incentive, such as 
immediate expensing, that individual taxpayers may elect or decline with the 
condition that a taxpayer cannot both take the government’s capital contribution 
towards the purchase of a share of an asset and execute a security interest to a third-
party lender over that same share. Expanding protections for unsecured and 
involuntary creditors through federal tax law maintains state authority over 
commercial and bankruptcy law and maintains taxpayer authority over their own 
purchases. Taxpayers are not forced—rather, they are economically  
incentivized—to hold a share of assets that would be available for unsecured and 
involuntary creditors. 
Automatically through operation of tax law, the government effectively 
purchases a share of an immediately expensed asset. This perspective offers a 
principled reason to prevent another party (the taxpayer) from placing a security 
interest on that share. Tax policy could be modified to prevent a taxpayer who 
immediately expenses an asset from encumbering the share effectively owned by the 
government. And such a modification to tax law would better protect currently 
under-protected unsecured creditors, while avoiding many of the critiques leveled 
against prior efforts to protect them through modifications to secured transactions 
or bankruptcy law. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Through the operation of tax law, the government contributes capital to and 
assumes ongoing risks of investments it does not select. This investment-like role 
makes relevant the government’s unique investment characteristics and priorities. If 
the government wished to use the government-as-investor perspective to identify 
its investment priorities and then advance those priorities through modifications to 
tax law, several modifications are implied. Some of these modifications should be 
rejected as inconsistent with the government’s other priorities and obligations. 
However, the value of the government-as-investor perspective is established by its 
suggestion of several modifications that are consistent with and can meaningfully 
advance traditional tax goals and broader social goals.  
This Article has identified several instances when, in pursuing its own investment interests, 
the government could promote broader societal interests. First, by phasing in and out 
immediate expensing policies automatically based on changes to relevant Treasury securities 
rates, the government could pay more of its share of investments up-front when  
up-front payment is most affordable while also targeting the stimulus provided by immediate 
expensing policies to times of recession and recovery. Second, by encouraging investments in 
buildings and other real property structures, the government could collect compensation for  
difficult-to-diversify risk that it does not bear while also reducing current distortions that cause 
underinvestment in these structures. Third, by refusing to allow interest deductions on 
immediately expensed property, the government could stop paying a share of debt expenses for 
debt it did not incur while also narrowing a problematic tax arbitrage opportunity. Finally, by 
establishing that only a portion of an immediately expensed asset may be subject to a security 
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interest, the government could mitigate its risk of investing in an overpriced asset while also 
establishing a partial unsecured interest to be available to various currently under-protected 
claimants, including former employees with unpaid wage claims, victims of wrongdoing with 
tort claims, and other involuntary and unsecured creditors.
 
  
 
